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INTRODUCTION 
ONCERNS over protecting the authority of states as sover-
eigns against ever-expanding central government power have 
animated much Supreme Court constitutional and jurisdictional ju-
risprudence since the nation’s infancy. In particular, the Rehnquist 
and Roberts Courts have sought to strengthen the walls of state 
sovereignty left crumbling by the Warren Court. Yet at the same 
time, the basic contours and meaning of state sovereignty remain 
contested and, some scholars argue, largely undefined outside of 
bare statements of principle.1 This Note seeks to fill a modest but 
important niche in that gap. 
Incoherence infects the practical application of federalism prin-
ciples to many aspects of federal judicial jurisdiction. This Note ex-
 
1 See, e.g., Timothy Zick, Are the States Sovereign?, 83 Wash. U. L.Q. 229, 230 
(2005). 
C 
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plores the lack of a consistent, tractable doctrinal framework un-
derlying state standing theory—that is, the ability of states to sue 
other governments or private parties as plaintiffs in federal court. 
In particular, sovereign state standing determines when one gov-
ernment may sue another in disputes over the exercise of funda-
mental governing prerogatives. Sovereign state standing is vital for 
our federalist system—and the uncertainty surrounding it all the 
more troubling—because without it states are essentially unable to 
shield themselves from the expansionist thrusts of other sovereigns, 
particularly the federal government. By joining the Union, the 
states renounced their ability to parry such thrusts with force, and 
as Justice Holmes declared, “the alternative to force is a suit in this 
court.”2 
This Note excavates a line of Supreme Court precedent that, 
buttressed by important normative considerations, points a way 
forward with regard to several aspects of this key issue. Part I de-
lineates the heretofore uncertain boundaries separating the three 
main categories of interests upon which states can premise standing 
to sue in federal court—proprietary, sovereign, and quasi-
sovereign interests. In particular, it seeks to lessen the pervasive 
confusion clouding the division between sovereign and quasi-
sovereign interests, ultimately arguing that these classes are mean-
ingfully distinct and should be treated differently. 
Part II demonstrates the propriety of the divergent treatment of 
sovereign and quasi-sovereign interests in the context of the juris-
dictional bar instituted by the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. 
Mellon, which declared that states acting as parens patriae cannot 
sue in federal court to invalidate or shield their citizens from fed-
eral law. The problem, however, is that parens patriae standing is 
an under-theorized concept, which has led to questions over what 
types of state interests it encompasses—and what the “Mellon bar” 
thus prohibits. By exploring what parens patriae standing actually 
entails, this is the first scholarly work to argue that the Mellon bar 
applies only to suits seeking to vindicate quasi-sovereign interests 
and thus does not apply to purely sovereignty-vindicating claims—
this Note’s central thesis. The few previous scholars to have 
 
2 Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907). 
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touched upon the issue uniformly imply that the bar applies to 
both. 
Finally, Part III illustrates the practical importance of this argu-
ment, applying it to the most critical and polarizing federalism dis-
pute of the new millennium: state challenges to the constitutional-
ity of federal healthcare reform. Until very recently, few realized  
that such an esoteric issue of federal courts jurisprudence, whether 
the Mellon bar bans sovereignty-vindicating claims, could derail a 
primary suit in this much-hyped set of litigation. In analyzing the 
ability of states to defend their most basic sovereign interests 
against encroachments by the federal government, the argument 
advanced herein simultaneously addresses an immediate flashpoint 
and an enduring puzzle of American federalism, illuminating a so-
lution supported by both precedent and policy. 
I. BACKGROUND: UNDERSTANDING STATE STANDING 
Section I.A outlines the policies behind standing and sketches 
the relevant doctrine. Section I.B then explores the history of state 
standing in federal courts in the context of three interests upon 
which it may be premised—proprietary, sovereign, and quasi-
sovereign interests—in particular attempting to shore up the doc-
trinal boundary between the latter two. 
A. Goals of Standing and Doctrinal Sketch 
Standing is an elemental yet murky jurisdictional issue rooted in 
the Constitution’s Article III “case or controversy” requirement: as 
the Supreme Court has stated, “Standing to sue is part of the com-
mon understanding of what it takes to make a justiciable case.”3 
Overall, “the gist of the question of standing” is whether petition-
ers have “such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy 
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presenta-
tion of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumina-
tion.”4 Inherent in this goal is a strong separation of powers under-
tone: where disputes are not sufficiently adversarial or lack other 
integral factors, they are likely to implicate congressional or presi-
 
3 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998); see U.S. Const. art. 
III, § 2, cl. 1 (extending the judicial power to certain cases and controversies). 
4 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). 
2011] Securing Sovereign State Standing 2055 
dential—as opposed to judicial—functions.5 The classic definition 
of standing contains three requirements: injury in fact, causation, 
and redressability.6 One component of the injury inquiry is the “in-
vasion of a legally protected interest.”7 As this Note explains, the 
bases upon which states, as distinct from individuals, can premise 
standing to sue in federal court include injuries to “proprietary,” 
“sovereign,” and “quasi-sovereign” interests (in addition to and 
sometimes overlapping with specifically granted statutory and con-
stitutional interests). The Court has articulated the evolving suffi-
ciency and boundaries of these interests in an intricate line of 
cases. 
B. Evolving Interests: The Supreme Court’s Shifting 
State Standing Doctrine 
First, common law or proprietary interests have always provided 
standing for state plaintiffs. Second, sovereign interests are those 
interests integral to a state’s core ability to govern; though the Su-
preme Court has never stated a comprehensive theory of sovereign 
standing, it has increasingly embraced it since the mid-nineteenth 
century. Third, quasi-sovereign interests, a nebulous class first for-
mulated by the Supreme Court at the turn of the twentieth century, 
are representational and thus derivative: that is, states have an in-
terest in protecting citizen welfare on a collective basis—as distin-
guished from proprietary and sovereign interests, which, this Note 
argues, states assert independently, on their own behalf. In addi-
tion to providing a necessary historical foundation for later argu-
ments, this Section proposes a bit of revisionist history regarding 
the Court’s early attitude toward sovereign state standing.8 
 
5 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992). 
6 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 2.3.1 (5th ed. 2007). 
7 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
8 To characterize the history discussed here as relating directly to what today is 
called “standing” may be anachronistic. Nevertheless, for conceptual clarity, this Note 
refers to this justiciability jurisprudence as part and parcel of the modern law of state 
standing and does not intend to wade into the debate concerning the doctrine’s consti-
tutional foundation (or lack thereof). See generally Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nel-
son, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 689, 689, 691 (2004) 
(noting that “academic critics insist that the law of standing is a recent ‘invention’ of 
federal judges” but arguing “that history does not defeat standing doctrine[, that] the 
notion of standing is not an innovation, and [that] its constitutionalization does not 
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1. Proprietary Interests 
Like any other litigant, a state may sue to vindicate common law 
interests, such as those protected by tort or contract law. These in-
terests are “proprietary” in that they are generally premised upon 
the state’s role as property owner. Existing scholarship teaches that 
these were essentially the only type of claim upon which states 
could bring a federal suit through the nineteenth century.9 As dis-
cussed below, however, early doctrine may not have been quite so 
exclusive. Regardless, states have always had standing to bring 
proprietary claims. 
2. Sovereign Interests 
a. What Are Sovereign Interests? 
As Professors Ann Woolhandler and Michael Collins explain in 
their foundational article on state standing, sovereign interests, in 
short, are states’ interests in their core ability to govern.10 They un-
derlie a state’s suit against another government “to establish its au-
thority to exercise legislative, executive, or judicial power within a 
particular territory or over a particular subject matter.”11 Sovereign 
 
contradict a settled historical consensus about the Constitution’s meaning”). I am in-
debted to Professor Michael Collins for alerting me to this point. 
9 See, e.g., Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 Va. L. Rev. 
387, 392–93 (1995). Article III clearly envisions states as parties in federal court, see 
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, yet in the nation’s infancy, the Supreme Court explicitly 
questioned whether Georgia could serve as plaintiff or defendant in separate disputes 
over Revolutionary War debts and ruled affirmatively, see Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 431–32 (1793); Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402, 405 
(1792). In doing so, the very early Court arguably appeared to limit states’ ability to 
act as litigants to traditional common law cases. See Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 405 
(“If the State has a right to the debt in question, it may be enforced at common 
law . . . .”). Scholars have thus declared that a state could initially bring suit only 
where it “looked like any other common-law rights-holding litigant who sought to en-
force or defend her proprietary . . . rights.” Woolhandler & Collins, supra, at 406. 
10 Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 9, at 411. Woolhandler and Collins classify 
three separate types of interests under the rubric of sovereign interests, see id. at 410–
11: this Note treats the term “sovereign interests” as synonymous with what they call 
“governing interests”; “enforcement interests”—discrete policy goals chosen by the 
legislature as worthy of pursuing through executive action (such as by prosecuting 
murderers or penalizing speeding motorists)—fall outside of this Note’s domain; and 
“public interests” are more properly deemed quasi-sovereign. 
11 Id. at 411. 
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interests can thus be understood as a state’s interests in its jurisdic-
tion—in terms of both (1) the geographic scope over which a gov-
ernment exercises power and (2) whether it has authority to do so. 
Indeed, this two-part “jurisdictional” framing of sovereign interests 
aligns well with the constitutional underpinnings of state sover-
eignty.12 
b. The Road to Supreme Court Acceptance 
The Supreme Court first expressed unease with state attempts to 
litigate sovereignty in the famous case of Chisholm v. Georgia.13 In 
denying Georgia sovereign immunity (a separate issue from sover-
eign standing), the Court appeared to reject state sovereignty alto-
gether, instead subscribing to a theory of pure popular sover-
eignty.14 The Court’s next occasion to consider the litigation of 
state sovereignty (and here, sovereign standing in particular) arose 
in Fowler v. Lindsey, in which two states attempted to join a pri-
vate property suit out of concern that the decision would affect 
their jurisdictional boundaries.15 The Court rebuffed the attempt, 
 
12 The Constitution does not include the word “sovereignty” or any variant thereof. 
In the structure of the government it sets up, however, it says a great deal about the 
relationship between states and the federal government. Because our federal system 
is necessarily one of dual sovereigns, the powers that the Constitution provides states 
do not amount to full sovereignty in the classical sense but are nevertheless meaning-
ful. As summarized by Professor Timothy Zick, these structural state sovereignty pro-
tections include the “rule of sovereign self-preservation” (protecting the existence of 
states from destruction by the federal government as necessary components of our 
constitutional plan), the “rule of separateness” (holding that the federal government 
has no authority to interfere with the internal orderings of state governments), the 
“rule of participation” (granting states certain roles in national governance), and the 
“rule of interpretive independence” (allowing states to interpret their own laws and 
constitutions without federal interference except as provided by the Supremacy 
Clause). Zick, supra note 1, at 288–93. The “jurisdictional” understanding of sover-
eign interests interweaves with these structural constitutional protections. For exam-
ple, for the federal government to interfere too extensively with the jurisdictional 
purview of a state—either geographically or regarding its scope of authority—
threatens the very existence of the state, implicating the rule of self-preservation. 
Likewise, for the rule of interpretive independence to have meaning, states must have 
the jurisdiction to promulgate and interpret laws in the first place. 
13 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 470–73 (1793). 
14 See id. at 471 (“[A]t the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the peo-
ple . . . .”). The backlash to this opinion famously resulted in the Eleventh Amend-
ment, which grants states broad sovereign immunity. 
15 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 411, 411–12 (1799). 
2058 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 97:2051 
declaring the “right of jurisdiction” an issue of sovereignty, not 
property (the “right of soil”), and thus not actionable at law.16 The 
property decision, it said, would not affect the states’ boundary 
line.17 
Next, in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., Penn-
sylvania argued that a bridge over the Ohio River, authorized by 
another state, would interfere with interstate commerce by ob-
structing large steamboats.18 The Court granted Pennsylvania 
standing because it alleged injury to its rights as a property holder 
(such as through loss of tolls from public works), declaring that the 
Commonwealth was thus “not a party in virtue of its sovereignty.”19 
The Court thereby purposely avoided a more definite ruling on the 
propriety of sovereign standing as a general matter.20 Contrary to 
suggestions,21 therefore, the decision admits only of skepticism to-
ward, not outright proscription of, sovereign state standing.22 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia occasioned the Court’s next discus-
sion of sovereign standing.23 The United States had granted the 
Cherokees certain areas by treaty, but Georgia enacted laws usurp-
ing the tribe’s authority over those lands.24 The Court disposed of 
the suit by holding that the Cherokees were not a foreign nation 
capable of invoking original Supreme Court jurisdiction, but it also 
hinted—while expressly declining to decide the issue—that matters 
of sovereignty were political questions beyond its jurisdictional 
purview.25 At the same time, Cherokee Nation and subsequent 
 
16 See id. at 412. 
17 Id. 
18 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 522–24 (1851). 
19 Id. at 559–60. 
20 A state’s “sovereignty is not involved in [its] business,” the Court explained, 
“[a]nd so in the present case, the rights asserted and relief prayed, are considered as 
in no respect different from those of an individual.” Id. at 560. “The sovereign powers 
of a State are adequate to the protection of its own citizens, and no other jurisdiction 
can be exercised over them, or in their behalf, except in a few specified cases,” the 
Court stated—without elaborating what those specified cases might be. See id. at 559. 
21 See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 9, at 444. 
22 See Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 19 (1900) (characterizing Wheeling & Belmont 
Bridge Co. as “treat[ing] the suit as brought to protect the property of the State of 
Pennsylvania”). 
23 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16–20 (1831). 
24 See id. at 15. 
25 Id. at 16–17, 20 (“The propriety of such an interposition by the court may be well 
questioned. It savors too much of the exercise of political power to be within the 
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cases indicated that the Court was in fact comfortable adjudicating 
sovereign claims incidental to proprietary ones26 or those brought 
by private parties,27 despite its suggestion that such issues consti-
tuted non-adjudicable political questions. It appears, therefore, 
that it was the prospect of governments acting as litigants of their 
own sovereignty rather than courts adjudicating issues of sover-
eignty more generally that concerned the Supreme Court. The 
Court was inhospitable to political plaintiffs, not political ques-
tions. 
The Supreme Court next addressed this Note’s central issue—
attempts by states to fight federal invasions of their sovereign in-
terests. According to Woolhandler and Collins, Mississippi v. John-
son28 and Georgia v. Stanton29 both “present applications of the 
principle that suits to vindicate sovereignty were nonjusticiable.”30 
Johnson, however, actually says nothing about state standing. 
There, Mississippi sought to enjoin President Johnson from execut-
ing the Reconstruction Acts, which temporarily replaced the gov-
ernments of former rebel states with federal military rule.31 The 
State argued that “[t]he acts in question annihilate the State and its 
government, by assuming for Congress the power to control, mod-
ify, and even abolish its government—in short, to exert sovereign 
power over it.”32 The Court, however, explicitly confined its ruling 
 
proper province of the judicial department. But the opinion on the point respecting 
parties makes it unnecessary to decide this question.”). 
26 See, e.g., Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 73 (1867) (attempting to re-
characterize Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838), as involving 
sovereignty only incidental to proprietary claims); Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 
at 51 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (arguing that the injury was cognizable as to property 
and that the case was therefore justiciable); see Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 9, 
at 414. 
27 See, e.g., Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 20 (suggesting that the sovereignty 
issue “might perhaps be decided by this court in a proper case with proper parties”); 
see Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 9, at 414. For example, the Court soon de-
clared a law of the type at issue in Cherokee Nation (a Georgia law derogating Chero-
kees’ sovereign interests) unconstitutional where the sovereignty argument was raised 
by an individual on a criminal appeal. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 
(1832). 
28 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866). 
29 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867). 
30 Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 9, at 416–17. 
31 See Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 475–76. 
32 Id. at 476. 
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to the separate question of whether any party could sue the Presi-
dent, addressing neither the fact that a state was plaintiff nor that 
sovereignty was at issue.33 
Stanton accords more directly with Woolhandler and Collins’s 
characterization. Like in Johnson, the state plaintiff challenged the 
Reconstruction Acts on sovereignty grounds.34 The Court found no 
subject matter jurisdiction, though, declaring that “the rights of 
sovereignty, of political jurisdiction, of government” are purely po-
litical questions.35 Admittedly, this constituted an out-and-out re-
fusal to grant sovereign state standing. Yet, significantly, it also 
represents the first and only time that the Court ruled thusly in an 
outcome-dispositive manner. 
Moreover, with Rhode Island v. Massachusetts in 1838, the Court 
began freely to recognize standing for states litigating border dis-
putes—perhaps the paradigmatic example of the state versus state 
suits contemplated by the authors of Article III—despite such 
claims involving only a “right[] of jurisdiction and sovereignty” 
rather than a “right of property in the soil.”36 As Woolhandler and 
Collins explain, “Boundary issues involve disputes over the power 
to make and apply law within a particular territory. Thus, . . . such 
cases presented issues of jurisdiction or sovereignty.”37 The Court 
defended its vindication of states’ sovereign interests in this context 
by “fram[ing] state ratification of the Constitution as one sovereign 
ceding dispute-resolving power to another,” a theory that has since 
become known as the “sovereignty-ceding rationale.”38 The Court’s 
 
33 See id. at 498 (“We shall limit our inquiry to the question presented by the objec-
tion, without expressing any opinion on the broader issues discussed in argument . . . . 
The single point which requires consideration is this: Can the President be restrained 
by injunction from carrying into effect an act of Congress alleged to be unconstitu-
tional?”). 
34 See Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 50. 
35 Id. at 77. 
36 See 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 752–53 (1838) (Taney, C.J., dissenting). 
37 Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 9, at 415. 
38 Robert A. Weinstock, Note, The Lorax State: Parens Patriae and the Provision of 
Public Goods, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 798, 803–04 & n.30 (2009) (“[T]his Court has ac-
quired jurisdiction over the parties in this cause, by their own consent and delegated 
authority; as their agent for executing the judicial power of the United States in the 
cases specified.” (quoting Rhode Island, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 720) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). Woolhandler and Collins attempt to mitigate what they call “the 
primary and largely exclusive example of the early Court’s willingness to allow states 
to vindicate sovereignty interests” by contending that these suits could be decided 
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recognition of sovereign standing in this context presaged its later 
general acceptance, cutting against scholarly overstatements of the 
early Court’s antipathy toward such standing. 
As discussed below in Subsection I.B.3, in addition to boundary 
cases, the Court soon “quietly began allowing” states to bring suits 
premised upon injuries other than traditional proprietary claims in 
the public nuisance context,39 evidence of the rapidly fading sali-
ence of its earlier declarations against sovereign standing. Indeed, 
the Court has heard boundary disputes with nary a word of protest 
since Rhode Island, and, all in all, “[b]y the early twentieth century 
the Court was actively and openly engaged in litigating sover-
eignty-based claims of states.”40 The start of the twentieth century 
was, not coincidentally, also the point at which quasi-sovereign in-
terests arrived on the jurisprudential scene, serving as an analytical 
bridge linking the Court’s previous skepticism toward sovereign 
state standing with its eventual embrace. Before turning to quasi-
sovereign interests, though, the next Subsection briefly confirms 
the general availability of sovereign state standing today. 
c. The Modern Validity of Sovereign State Standing 
Admittedly, Stanton provides what would appear to be strong 
precedent against the validity of sovereign state standing and thus 
against a necessary premise of this Note—that such standing is 
available to states today. Though the Supreme Court has never ex-
pressly overruled Stanton’s holding concerning sovereign state 
standing, at least five types of evidence seem to demonstrate per-
suasively that it has cast that holding aside, repudiating it in prac-
tice if not in words. 
First and most conspicuously, a high profile Supreme Court con-
currence harshly criticizes the broadness of Stanton’s formulation 
of the political question doctrine, admitting that the case’s “ques-
tion was no more ‘political’ than a host of others we have enter-
 
under traditional property and equity principles and that they might have involved 
proprietary interests after all. See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 9, at 415–16 & 
n.99. 
39 Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 9, at 446. 
40 Weinstock, supra note 38, at 806. 
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tained.”41 In thus undermining the strength of Stanton moving for-
ward, the opinion notably cited, inter alia, state-as-plaintiff suits.42 
Second, scholars have assumed that Stanton no longer holds wa-
ter. Though none appears to have focused specific attention on the 
case’s continuing legitimacy, several have implicitly treated it as in-
validated by later doctrinal shifts by asserting the modern viability 
of sovereign state standing.43 Even scholars (particularly Woolhan-
dler and Collins) who advocate returning to the anti-sovereign-
standing theory underlying Stanton recognize that such a maneuver 
would be precisely that: a return to a paradigm from which the 
Court has since moved far away.44 
Third, the Supreme Court has spoken enthusiastically about the 
importance of federal courts opening their doors to state parties 
where sovereignty is at issue in related contexts—for example, 
granting original Supreme Court jurisdiction45 and allowing inter-
vention by states in lawsuits challenging the enforceability of their 
statutes.46 The Court’s eagerness for federal court adjudication of 
such state sovereignty questions runs directly counter to, and thus 
militates against, any continuing salience of the Stanton doctrine’s 
overt and blanket inhospitality to states’ sovereign interests. 
 
41 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 246 n.3 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
42 See id. (citing Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954); Pennsylvania v. West Vir-
ginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923)). 
43 See, e.g., 13B Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 3531.11.1 (3d ed. 2008) (“It is accepted that states . . . have standing to protect pro-
prietary and sovereign interests . . . .”); Weinstock, supra note 38, at 803, 806 (stating 
that “[t]he categorical rule against the adjudication of sovereign interests became un-
tenable” and that “[b]y the early twentieth century the Court was actively and openly 
engaged in litigating sovereignty-based claims of states”). 
44 See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 9, at 504–05 (“The analogy of governmen-
tal standing to individual standing once supplied a limiting principle for 
gover[n]mental suits. . . . [But u]nder the Supreme Court’s current injury-in-fact in-
quiry, any interest that government might legitimately pursue or protect could, if in-
terfered with, provide a basis for standing . . . .”). 
45 For instance, the Court has cited boundary disputes as “supporting an inference 
that issues of sovereignty, far from being nonjusticiable, present the most appropriate 
questions for the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction.” Id. at 415 & n.98 (citing 
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 743 (1981); id. at 766 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing)). 
46 See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986) (stating, in recognizing stand-
ing, that “a State clearly has a legitimate interest in the continued enforceability of its 
own statutes”). 
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The Supreme Court has also demonstrated its contemporary 
recognition of sovereign state standing directly—sometimes 
openly, sometimes implicitly. Illustrating implicit acceptance, the 
fourth type of evidence, the Court has granted sovereign standing 
without comment on several occasions, apparently assuming that, 
Stanton notwithstanding, grievances based on sovereign interests 
are now adjudicable.47 A fundamental tenet of jurisdictional doc-
trine holds that a court cannot consider the merits of a case if it 
does not possess subject matter jurisdiction, which includes stand-
ing.48 Moreover, it is the court’s responsibility to raise such jurisdic-
tional defects sua sponte if the parties fail to do so.49 Thus, for a 
court to advance to a case’s merits without addressing standing 
likely represents strong (if not conclusive) evidence that standing 
indeed exists. 
Fifth and most compellingly, as expounded more fully in the 
next Subsection, the Court has explicitly established that sovereign 
interests today form a valid basis for state standing. In particular, in 
Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, it included 
“sovereign interests” as one “kind[] of interest[] that a State may 
pursue” through standing in federal court.50 Moreover, no recent 
counterexamples reflecting any continuing wholesale ban on sov-
ereign standing appear to exist. 
In sum, the Supreme Court was initially wary of sovereign state 
standing, yet only once, with the whole of Reconstruction at stake 
in Stanton, did it expressly deny a state standing to vindicate its 
sovereign interests. Previous cases spoke only in dicta, rendering 
 
47 For examples outside of the boundary context, see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 
383 U.S. 301, 323–29 (1966) (allowing sovereign Tenth Amendment and state equality 
claims where the state alleged no proprietary injuries), discussed more fully infra Part 
II, and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187–88 (1992) (ruling for New York 
on a Tenth Amendment claim asserting sovereign injury only—though it likely could 
have pled proprietary injury as well). 
48 See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (“Without 
jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to de-
clare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is 
that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” (citation omitted)). 
49 See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (raising 
question of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte). 
50 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982); see also, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519 
(2007) (“Massachusetts’ well-founded desire to preserve its sovereign territory [sup-
ports jurisdiction].”). 
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statements against sovereign standing largely immaterial. The doc-
trine declaring sovereign interests non-litigable, therefore, appears 
to have been weaker than previous scholarship has claimed, and 
several pieces of evidence show that the Court has since effectively 
rejected it, now recognizing states’ sovereign interests as enforce-
able in federal courts. 
3. Quasi-Sovereign Interests 
At common law, governments could bring public nuisance suits 
either as criminal prosecutions or equitable demands for injunc-
tions.51 Because states might allege nuisance to protect their citi-
zenry and land generally as opposed to state-owned property spe-
cifically, state proprietary interests were not exclusively or even 
necessarily at stake. Thus, the question arose whether states had 
standing to bring equitable nuisance actions in federal court.52 To 
the extent that these suits stem from the state’s role as “protect[or 
of] its citizens’ general interests,” they can be seen as raising ques-
tions related to sovereignty.53 As discussed more fully below, how-
ever, these interests are meaningfully distinct from true sovereign 
interests. The Supreme Court has thus placed them in a separate 
category called “quasi-sovereign interests.” Woolhandler and 
Collins maintain that the Court initially found state public nuisance 
actions cognizable only where they alleged injury to state-owned 
property in addition to citizen welfare.54 But just as the purported 
general bar against non-proprietary claims was perhaps not so 
definite, neither, it appears, was this permutation.55 In any case, by 
 
51 Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 9, at 432. 
52 Id. at 432–33. 
53 Id. at 411, 432–33. 
54 Id. at 432–33. 
55 The three cases that Woolhandler and Collins cite arguably support alternate, 
even conflicting, interpretations. See id. at 433 & nn.176–79. First, Mayor of George-
town v. Alexandria Canal Co. dealt with a city, not a state. See 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 91, 99 
(1838). Quite separate from the constitutional issue of state sovereignty, the Court 
stated that the plaintiff city and its officials did not “even pretend[] that . . . they have 
any power or authority . . . to take care of, protect, and vindicate, in a court of justice, 
the rights of the citizens of the town.” Id. Second, as explained above, Wheeling & 
Belmont Bridge Co. deliberately avoided ruling on sovereign standing as a general 
matter by simply specifying that proprietary interests conferred standing in that case. 
See 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 561–62. Third, South Carolina v. Georgia explicitly denied 
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the year 1900, the Court had decisively abandoned any such re-
quirement. 
In Missouri v. Illinois, the Supreme Court allowed Missouri to 
bring a public nuisance action against Illinois for polluting the Mis-
sissippi River, expressly noting that state proprietary interests were 
not at stake but that “it must surely be conceded that, if the health 
and comfort of the inhabitants of a State are threatened, the State 
is the proper party to represent and defend them.”56 This statement 
echoed one of a year earlier. In Louisiana v. Texas, Louisiana 
claimed that a Texas quarantine amounted to a discriminatory em-
bargo.57 Though the Court dismissed the suit for other reasons,58 it 
recognized Louisiana’s interest as litigable despite the lack of 
claimed proprietary injury, accepting that “the State is entitled to 
seek relief in this way because the matters complained of affect her 
citizens at large.”59 
The term “quasi-sovereign” soon emerged to describe these in-
terests. Justice Holmes originated the label in Georgia v. Tennessee 
Copper Co., in which Georgia sought to enjoin the emission of nox-
ious gases across the state line.60 He explained that the State’s liti-
gable “quasi-sovereign interest” existed “independent of and be-
hind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its 
domain.”61 The Court again adopted the sovereignty-ceding ration-
ale, which thereafter became a fixture in state standing jurispru-
dence, declaring that “[w]hen the States by their union made the 
forcible abatement of outside nuisances impossible to each, they 
did not thereby agree to submit to whatever might be done. They 
did not renounce . . . their still remaining quasi-sovereign interests; 
and the alternative to force is a suit in this court.”62 Justice Holmes 
thereby “conceived of state-as-party suits as substitutes for the use 
of force or diplomacy—as an alternative avenue for the exercise of 
 
expressing any opinion on the standing of states not alleging proprietary injuries. 93 
U.S. 4, 14 (1876). 
56 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901). 
57 176 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1900). 
58 Id. at 22–23. 
59 Id. at 19. 
60 See 206 U.S. 230, 236 (1907). 
61 Id. at 237. 
62 Id. 
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state power.”63 The Court thus held that the federal judiciary has a 
responsibility predicated on structural constitutional grounds to al-
low states to vindicate their sovereignty. 
Early state public nuisance suits were transitional, facilitating the 
Court’s shift away from its initial skepticism of sovereignty-related 
claims.64 With Tennessee Copper’s declaration that state standing 
provided a constitutionally mandated avenue for state power, 
though, a seismic shift became evident. The Court now saw liti-
gable state interests as “deriving not merely from common-law 
proprietary interests but also from the state’s ‘police power’ to 
regulate . . . for the public good. Injury to the state’s generalized in-
terest in protecting its citizens, which previously could have been 
vindicated (if at all) only through [legislation], now provided a ba-
sis for standing . . . .”65 
Quasi-sovereign interests thereafter became a robust foundation 
for state standing,66 yet they remained poorly understood, with the 
Court waiting until 1982 to clarify the doctrine. In Alfred L. Snapp, 
the plaintiff Territory sued Virginia apple growers for failing to 
provide benefits due Puerto Rican workers pursuant to federal 
statute, claiming discrimination against Puerto Ricans and injury to 
the Territory’s economy.67 The Court found these to be litigable 
quasi-sovereign interests.68 Writing for the Court, Justice White 
undertook the formal delineation of the above-identified bases for 
state standing—proprietary, sovereign, and quasi-sovereign inter-
ests.69 A quasi-sovereign interest is “a judicial construct that does 
not lend itself to a simple or exact definition,” he stated, but at bot-
tom, “[q]uasi-sovereign interests . . . are [neither] sovereign inter-
ests [nor] proprietary interests.”70 
Of particular significance is the Court’s description of sovereign 
interests. The above statement clearly indicates that quasi-
 
63 Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 9, at 450–51. 
64 Id. at 450. 
65 Id. at 451 (specifically analogizing the regulation of property to states’ public nui-
sance suits, though the principle can certainly apply more broadly). 
66 See Alfred L. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 603–06 (collecting cases). 
67 Id. at 594, 597–98. 
68 Id. at 608 & n.15. 
69 Id. at 601–02. States can also serve as “nominal part[ies]” in suits vindicating pri-
vate interests, Justice White noted. Id. at 602. 
70 Id. at 601–02. 
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sovereign interests are not a subset of sovereign interests but a 
separate doctrinal entity accorded separate treatment. The Court 
proceeded to define sovereign interests by example: “Two sover-
eign interests are easily identified: first, the exercise of sovereign 
power over individuals and entities within the relevant jurisdic-
tion—this involves the power to create and enforce a legal 
code . . . ; second, the demand for recognition from other sover-
eigns—most frequently this involves the maintenance and recogni-
tion of borders.”71 This formulation fairly precisely matches—and 
indeed helps form the basis of—this Note’s two-part “jurisdic-
tional” framing of sovereign interests. 
Quasi-sovereign interests, in contrast, “consist of a set of inter-
ests that the State has in the well-being of its populace.”72 They are 
generalized interests in citizen welfare, not collections of discrete 
private party interests for which the state serves as a nominal plain-
tiff.73 Two “general categories” are discernible: “the health and 
well-being—both physical and economic—of [a State’s] residents in 
general” and its “interest in not being discriminatorily denied its 
rightful status within the federal system” by being excluded from 
benefits flowing from such.74 
 
71 Id. at 601. 
72 Id. at 602. 
73 See id. 
74 See id. at 607–08. The Court’s most recent extended consideration of quasi-
sovereign standing came in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 505 (2007), in which 
Massachusetts challenged the EPA’s decision not to address global warming under 
the Clean Air Act. The Commonwealth blamed decreasing land mass on rising sea 
levels, but because this injury was not confined to state-owned property, the classifica-
tion of the underlying interest was in question. See id. at 522–23. Justice Stevens’s ma-
jority opinion failed to provide a clear answer, instead intimating that all three classes 
of interests were at stake. See id. at 518–21; see also Weinstock, supra note 38, at 817. 
At base, though, EPA’s main standing issue (whether states should receive “special 
solicitude” in standing analysis relative to private parties), largely left undecided, is 
only tangentially relevant here. See EPA, 549 U.S. at 536–40 (Roberts, C.J., dissent-
ing) (outlining and arguing the issue). The Court reconsidered the standing portion of 
EPA in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2011), an-
other global warming case, last term. The eight participating Justices divided equally 
over the question, thereby affirming the lower court’s grant of standing with no pre-
cedential effect. Id. The Justices opposing standing relied at least in part upon argu-
ments from Chief Justice Roberts’s EPA dissent. Id. 
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4. Summary, Significance, and a Word on Popular Sovereignty 
To summarize, there are three main classes of interests to which 
states can claim injury as plaintiffs in federal court—proprietary, 
sovereign, and quasi-sovereign interests. Proprietary interests im-
plicate the state’s role as property owner; sovereign interests impli-
cate its core ability to govern—its jurisdiction; and quasi-sovereign 
interests implicate the general, collective welfare of its citizens. 
Some practical distinctions are immediately observable. First, 
states will generally claim sovereign standing only vis-à-vis other 
governments, not private parties, because such suits involve com-
peting jurisdictional claims. Second, because a state’s quasi-
sovereign interests appear to be essentially coextensive with the 
scope of its police power, their universe is potentially almost 
boundless. Finally, states may choose to premise complaints upon 
one class of interests to the exclusion of others for strategic rea-
sons.75 This Note returns to these observations below. 
The most significant distinction to emerge is conceptual. In 
short, quasi-sovereign interests are derivative, whereas proprietary 
and sovereign interests are independent. A state’s quasi-sovereign 
interests are derivative of its citizens’ interests because, to quote 
Justice Holmes, they lie “behind” them.76 Quasi-sovereign interests 
are collective, representational. In contrast, truly sovereign inter-
ests (like proprietary interests) are fully independent in that they 
are held by states qua states; they advance the ability of states to 
govern generally rather than advancing citizen welfare in any par-
ticular matter.77 
 
75 For instance, proprietary injuries may be the easiest to prove if the goal is simply 
to secure a federal forum. States may choose to emphasize sovereign or quasi-
sovereign injuries, in contrast, for symbolic or political reasons—such as, respectively, 
taking a strong stance against a rival government or appearing as a white knight vin-
dicating the grievances of otherwise powerless citizens. 
76 See Tenn. Copper, 206 U.S. at 237; see also Weinstock, supra note 38, at 805. 
77 See Chemerinsky, supra note 6, § 2.3.7 (“[A] distinction can and has been drawn 
between instances where the government is protecting its own sovereign or proprie-
tary interests and where it is suing on behalf of interests of its citizens.”); see also 
EPA, 549 U.S. at 520 n.17 (emphasizing the “critical difference between allowing a 
State to protect her citizens from the operation of federal statutes (which is what Mel-
lon prohibits) and allowing a State to assert its rights under federal law (which it has 
standing to do)” (citation omitted)). This is not to argue that a state has no independ-
ent interest underlying a quasi-sovereign claim, which would contradict the statement 
in Tennessee Copper that quasi-sovereign interests are “independent of and behind 
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This conclusion is subject to the counterargument from strong 
popular sovereigntists that the state neither should nor can act in-
dependently of its citizens—that all state power and property de-
rive from the populace that vests it with authority. A meaningful 
exploration of the centuries-old political theory debate between 
government sovereigntists and popular sovereigntists lies outside 
the domain of this Note. In short, popular and government sover-
eignty—in their purest forms—are mutually exclusive models. Yet 
in practice, even strong adherents of state sovereignty must ac-
knowledge that the “sentiment that the people who consented to 
the social contract are the only ‘true’ sovereign is an accurate 
statement of political theory so far as it goes.”78 The problem, how-
ever, is that this sentiment does not, in fact, go very far. Sover-
eignty retains meaningful content—its ontological core—only 
when it resides at least partially in governments, not solely in the 
hands of the people themselves, because “the people” have no effi-
cient method of expressing or enforcing their “sovereignty” in re-
sponse to the real challenges regularly faced by political actors on 
the national stage.79 In contrast, states do: “In pragmatic terms, the 
concept of sovereignty can only serve its purposes if we accept that 
the states are the institutions that exercise ‘sovereign’ powers.”80 
This Note therefore declines to adopt pure popular sover-
eignty—but does not intend to minimize or dismiss the healthy de-
bate surrounding this issue. Rather, it simply recognizes that, all in 
all, popular sovereignty in its absolute form is beset by flaws both 
practical, as illuminated here, and constitutional—in terms of the 
Framers’ careful inclusion of structural scaffolding for state sover-
eignty81 and the Supreme Court’s continuing recognition of such in 
a variety of jurisprudential contexts. Finally, to the extent that this 
Note challenges certain aspects of Woolhandler and Collins’s wide-
ranging and valuable article State Standing, it is because they advo-
cate a strong popular sovereigntist approach.82 
 
the titles of its citizens.” See 206 U.S. at 237 (emphasis added). Rather, the state’s in-
terest is not wholly independent as in sovereign and proprietary claims. 
78 Zick, supra note 1, at 334–35. 
79 See id. at 335. 
80 Id. 
81 See supra note 12. 
82 See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 9. 
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II. THE PRESENT ISSUE: SOVEREIGN STANDING IN THE FACE 
OF THE MELLON BAR 
This Part brings into focus the issue at the heart of this Note: the 
intersection—or lack thereof—of sovereign and parens patriae 
standing. Section II.A presents an overview of parens patriae stand-
ing, including the rule against state suits challenging federal law 
formulated in Massachusetts v. Mellon and thus dubbed “the Mel-
lon bar.” It proceeds to expose the jurisprudential and scholarly in-
coherence underlying Mellon’s interpretation. Section II.B summa-
rizes the Supreme Court’s application of the Mellon bar to date, 
and Sections II.C and II.D propose and defend a theory for curing 
the doctrinal confusion infecting this area. 
A. Introducing Mellon’s Parens Patriae Bar: Interests and 
Incoherence 
“Parens patriae means literally ‘parent of the country,’” the Su-
preme Court has explained.83 Traditionally, the term referred, inter 
alia, to the role of the state “as sovereign and guardian of persons 
under legal disability,”84 a function stemming from the “royal pre-
rogative.”85 The judicially created doctrine at issue here derives 
from this traditional meaning in that “underlying the concept of 
parens patriae is the notion that the sovereign, as parent, must pro-
tect its citizenry.”86 An injury litigated under parens patriae stand-
ing, therefore, must be so diffuse as to invade the citizenry’s collec-
tive interests; states cannot act as parens patriae in the nominal 
representation of private plaintiffs.87 
Before further exploring what such standing entails, an introduc-
tion to the Mellon bar, which prohibits state parens patriae suits in 
certain circumstances, is in order. The Supreme Court articulated 
the bar in the 1921 case Massachusetts v. Mellon, in which Massa-
chusetts sued various federal officials on the ground that the Ma-
ternity Act of 1921 violated the Tenth Amendment by invading ar-
 
83 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982). 
84 Black’s Law Dictionary 1003 (5th ed. 1979). 
85 See Alfred L. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 600–01 (providing a general historical overview). 
86 See Gary Igal Strausberg, The Standing of a State as Parens Patriae to Sue the 
Federal Government, 35 Fed. B.J. 1, 4–5 (1976). 
87 See Alfred L. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 600, 602. 
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eas of exclusive state control.88 The Commonwealth brought suit 
both on its own behalf and as representative of its citizens.89 
Justice Sutherland first relied upon Georgia v. Stanton and 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia to dispose of the independent Tenth 
Amendment claim, holding that asserted injuries to sovereign in-
terests automatically constitute non-litigable political questions,90 a 
position that the Court has (and even then largely had) aban-
doned.91 The Court then (and only then) asked “whether the suit 
may be maintained by the State as the representative of its citi-
zens.”92 The answer, it held, was no, instituting Mellon’s jurisdic-
tional bar with the following key passage: 
It cannot be conceded that a State, as parens patriae, may insti-
tute judicial proceedings to protect citizens of the United States 
from the operation of the statutes thereof . . . . [I]t is no part of its 
duty or power to enforce their rights in respect of their relations 
with the Federal Government. In that field it is the United States, 
and not the State, which represents them as parens patriae . . . .93 
This central principle has become settled law.94 Its on-the-ground 
application, however, remains clouded in confusion. 
Mellon thus instituted the rule that a state cannot sue to protect 
its citizens from the proper implementation of federal law when 
acting in its parens patriae capacity. The logical next step, there-
fore, is determining when—in pursuing which set or sets of inter-
ests—the state functions as parens patriae. This issue plays out on 
two levels of generality. The more abstract is the question of 
parens patriae standing generally. As this Section demonstrates, all 
agree that states act as parens patriae when vindicating quasi-
sovereign interests; the stumbling block is whether they also act as 
 
88 262 U.S. 447, 479 (1923). 
89 Id. 
90 See id. at 483–85. 
91 See supra Subsection I.B.2.c. 
92 Mellon, 262 U.S. at 485. 
93 Id. at 485–86. 
94 See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323–24 (1966) (refusing 
standing to assert, inter alia, citizens’ due process rights against enforcement of fed-
eral anti-discrimination statute); see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 
n.17 (2007) (reaffirming the rule in dicta); Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico 
ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 610 n.16 (1982) (same). 
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such when asserting injury to sovereign interests. Conceptually, the 
answer should turn on whether sovereign interests are merely de-
rivative of citizens’ personal interests or whether states hold them 
independently as asserted above. The more particularized question 
is how the larger matter maps onto Mellon: does its jurisdictional 
bar prohibit only suits premised upon quasi-sovereignty or also 
sovereignty? 
There is strong evidence that, from the beginning, state parens 
patriae and quasi-sovereign standing have been inextricably and 
exclusively intertwined, even synonymous. Both are representative 
of citizens’ general interests—as opposed to interests that are fully 
independent and pursued for the state itself. As one scholar ex-
plains, therefore, when invoking parens patriae standing, “the gov-
ernment entity sues not to protect its sovereign or proprietary in-
terests, but instead litigates as a representative for its citizens.”95 
Another commentator puts the point even more directly: “A state 
may institute suit in its parens patriae capacity for injuries to its 
quasi-sovereign interests only.”96 
Many courts, including the Supreme Court, appear to agree. For 
instance, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has ex-
plained parens patriae doctrine in precisely these terms, character-
izing its rationale as “creat[ing] an exception to normal rules of 
standing [as would be] applied to private citizens in recognition of 
the special role that a State plays in pursuing its quasi-sovereign in-
terests.”97 Most critically, the Supreme Court confirmed this read-
ing in Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, its 
most sustained and coherent explanation of parens patriae doctrine 
to date, by expressly and exclusively linking such standing with the 
vindication of quasi-sovereign interests, stating that “[i]n order to 
maintain [a parens patriae] action, the State . . . must express a 
quasi-sovereign interest.”98 The Alfred L. Snapp Court relied upon 
several precedents in formulating this characterization—for exam-
ple, describing Louisiana v. Texas as “distinguishing [the state’s 
parens patriae interest] from [its] sovereign and proprietary inter-
 
95 Chemerinsky, supra note 6, § 2.3.7. 
96 Strausberg, supra note 86, at 9. 
97 Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. DeCoster, 229 F.3d 332, 335 (1st Cir. 2000). 
98 458 U.S. at 607. 
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ests.”99 Louisiana, of course, is also the point in the case law that 
has been labeled the origin of quasi-sovereign standing, as dis-
cussed above.100 Moreover, Supreme Court applications of the Mel-
lon bar, to which the next Section turns, appear amply, if implicitly, 
to confirm the proposition that parens patriae doctrine encom-
passes only quasi-sovereign claims. 
It would appear that Alfred L. Snapp’s exposition of the matter 
should be controlling. The problem, however, is that neither courts 
nor scholars have consistently followed its example of making the 
synonymous relationship of parens patriae and quasi-sovereign 
standing so explicit. Parens patriae doctrine and the Mellon bar in 
particular thus remain frustratingly muddled. Specifically, many 
continue to conflate the distinct classes of quasi-sovereign and sov-
ereign interests, contributing to doctrinal incoherence by suggest-
ing that parens patriae standing underlies both. 
For example, one year prior to Alfred L. Snapp, the Third Cir-
cuit characterized parens patriae standing as an appropriate vehicle 
to vindicate Pennsylvania’s so-called “sovereign interests” in pre-
venting lawlessness and the violation of citizens’ constitutional 
rights101—though at least the latter claim would appear to be quasi-
sovereign. Before Alfred L. Snapp, even the Supreme Court sug-
gested that parens patriae standing embraced both sovereign and 
quasi-sovereign claims—for instance, denying such standing be-
cause “[n]o sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests of [the State] are 
implicated.”102 The issue has persisted even after Alfred L. Snapp, 
 
99 Id. at 602–03. 
100 See supra Subsection I.B.3. Specifically, the Louisiana Court stated that the 
cause of action must be regarded not as involving any infringement of the pow-
ers of the State of Louisiana, or any special injury to her property, but as assert-
ing that the State is entitled to seek relief in this way because the matters com-
plained of affect her citizens at large. 
Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 19 (1900). Alfred L. Snapp also cited Missouri v. Illi-
nois and Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. as further examples of early state parens 
patriae suits vindicating quasi-sovereign interests. See Alfred L. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 
603–04. Moreover, in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of California, the Court explicitly 
recognized “the right of a State to sue as parens patriae to prevent or repair harm to 
its ‘quasi-sovereign’ interests”—excluding other interests by clear negative implica-
tion. 405 U.S. 251, 258 (1972). And just as the scope of quasi-sovereign interests has 
expanded commensurate with the judicial understanding of police power, so has 
parens patriae standing. See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 9, at 474–78. 
101 See Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659 F.2d 306, 315–16 (3d Cir. 1981). 
102 Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 666 (1976) (per curiam). 
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with district courts recently proclaiming that “[t]o maintain [a 
parens patriae] action, the state must assert a sovereign interest”103 
and that “[a] State has standing to sue [as parens patriae] only 
when its sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests are implicated.”104 
Even a 2010 Supreme Court opinion illustrates the issue, quoting 
(in peripheral dictum) a 1953 declaration that “when a State is ‘a 
party to a suit involving a matter of sovereign interest,’ it is parens 
patriae and ‘must be deemed to represent all [of] its citizens.’”105 
Scholarship reflects the same misperceptions. “Basically,” one 
early commentator claimed, “the types of cases in which a state has 
capacity to sue have been classified as proprietary suits and parens 
patriae suits”—with both sovereign and quasi-sovereign claims ap-
parently falling into the latter category.106 A more recent work pro-
claims that “parens patriae standing serves to permit the state-led 
litigation of injuries to what judges label ‘sovereign’ or ‘quasi-
sovereign’ interests.”107 Likewise, Woolhandler and Collins write 
that the Mellon bar signifies the partial survival of the Court’s early 
prohibitions against states vindicating both “public” and “govern-
ing” interests, their respective labels for quasi-sovereign and sover-
eign interests, implying that the bar acts upon both.108 
B. Supreme Court Interpretations of the Mellon Bar 
Mellon does not explicitly state which interests its parens patriae 
bar prevents states from vindicating through suit. It is thus worth 
examining any clues that the opinion and its later interpretations 
might provide to determine whether the bar prohibits only suits 
seeking to vindicate quasi-sovereign interests or those asserting in-
 
103 City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 315 F. Supp. 2d 256, 265 (E.D.N.Y. 
2004). 
104 United States v. Olin Corp., 606 F. Supp. 1301, 1305 (N.D. Ala. 1985) (quoting 
Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. at 665). 
105 South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854, 863 (2010) (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting New Jersey v. New York, 345 U.S. 369, 372–73 (1953)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
106 See William MacNider Trott, Note, Federal Jurisdiction—Suits by a State as 
Parens Patriae, 48 N.C. L. Rev. 963, 963 (1970). 
107 Weinstock, supra note 38, at 799. Weinstock later repeats this classification, con-
trasting both quasi-sovereign and sovereign interests to others not supported by 
parens patriae standing. See id. at 807. 
108 Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 9, at 435. 
2011] Securing Sovereign State Standing 2075 
jury to sovereign interests as well. This Section seeks chiefly to de-
scribe the relevant precedent, to which Subsection II.D.1 returns 
for analysis. 
Florida v. Mellon represents an early exercise of the jurisdic-
tional bar (in favor of the same federal defendant sued in Massa-
chusetts v. Mellon).109 There, the State sought leave to file a com-
plaint against federal officials to enjoin enforcement of a statute 
discounting a federal tax on individuals by the amount paid in state 
inheritance tax.110 Florida’s constitution prohibited it from imposing 
such a tax.111 The State alleged injury on three separate grounds. 
First, Florida claimed proprietary injury because the statute would 
“cause the withdrawal of property from the state with the conse-
quent loss to the state of subjects of taxation.”112 Second, it alleged 
sovereign injury by claiming that the statute was meant to coerce 
the State to impose an inheritance tax in contravention of its con-
stitution.113 Finally, it sued as parens patriae, alleging unconstitu-
tional discrimination under the Uniformity Clause.114 
The Court easily disposed of the parens patriae claim under the 
Mellon bar.115 Yet its ruling as to the State’s claimed proprietary 
and sovereign injuries was entirely distinct: 
The act assailed was passed by Congress in pursuance of its 
power to lay and collect taxes, and, following the decision of this 
court in respect of the preceding act of 1916, New York Trust Co. 
v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 [(1921)], must be held to be constitu-
tional. . . . The act is a law of the United States made in pursu-
ance of the Constitution and, therefore, the supreme law of the 
land, the constitution or laws of the states to the contrary not-
withstanding.116 
The Court thus denied Florida leave to file by refusing it both 
parens patriae and sovereign standing. It analyzed the two, how-
ever, both separately and using different theories. 
 
109 273 U.S. 12, 18 (1927). 
110 Id. at 15. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 16. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 18. 
116 Id. at 17 (paraphrasing the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2). 
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Another well-known application of the bar blocked South Caro-
lina’s attack on the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965 in South Carolina v. Katzenbach.117 The State advanced sev-
eral arguments: (1) that the statute encroached upon a legislative 
area reserved to the states, (2) that it violated the principle of state 
equality, (3) that it denied due process, (4) that it constituted a for-
bidden bill of attainder, and (5) that it impaired the separation of 
powers.118 The Court declared that the latter three constitutional 
claims “may be dismissed at the outset” because they could be 
made by individuals only, not states.119 That is, the Mellon bar pro-
hibited them.120 The first two arguments, however, were premised 
upon sovereign interests. The Court proceeded to adjudicate their 
merits directly, implicitly recognizing standing.121 
The line’s final case proves frustratingly opaque. In 1970, Massa-
chusetts enacted a statute providing that no citizen serving in the 
military could be required to engage in foreign combat not author-
ized by Congress under the War Powers Clause.122 The act’s express 
purpose was to force a federal judicial determination of the Viet-
nam War’s constitutionality.123 Under the statute, the attorney gen-
eral was to sue “in the name and on behalf of the commonwealth 
and on behalf of any inhabitants thereof.”124 As bases for standing 
in the resulting suit, Massachusetts v. Laird, Massachusetts cited 
what it claimed were proprietary injuries—loss of the services and 
taxes of citizens killed in battle, federal funding diverted to the war 
effort, and so on—as well as its parens patriae capacity to protect 
 
117 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323–24 (1966).  
118 Id. at 323. 
119 Id. at 323–24. 
120 See id. at 324; Robert David Jacobs, Note, Standing of States to Represent the 
Interests of Their Citizens in Federal Court, 21 Am. U. L. Rev. 224, 237 (1971) 
(“[T]he Court noted that [these aspects of] South Carolina’s claim [were] brought as 
parens patriae of its citizens rather than in its own sovereign interest and reiterated 
the principle articulated in Mellon . . . .”). 
121 See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324. 
122 Act of Apr. 2, 1970, ch. 174, § 1, 1970 Mass. Acts 77, cited in Jacobs, supra note 
120, at 224–25. 
123 See Jacobs, supra note 120, at 225. 
124 Act of Apr. 2, 1970, ch. 174, § 2, 1970 Mass. Acts 77, quoted in Jacobs, supra note 
120, at 225. 
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its citizens from the war’s deleterious effects.125 The Court denied 
leave to file the complaint summarily and without comment,126 leav-
ing the standing question open.127 Justice Douglas’s impassioned 
dissenting plea to reconsider Mellon, however, strongly suggests 
that its jurisdictional bar provided a basis for the denial.128 
In sum, though the Supreme Court has never expressly identified 
what sort of claims the Mellon bar prohibits, it appears to have 
treated alleged injuries to sovereign and quasi-sovereign interests 
quite differently. Subsection II.D.1 analyzes the significance of this 
disparity. 
C. Mellon’s Inapplicability to Sovereign Standing: The Basic 
Argument 
The argument from popular sovereignty—because it does not 
view sovereign interests as held independently by states and thus 
distinct from quasi-sovereign interests—would urge that the Mel-
lon bar apply to both sorts of state challenges to federal law: 
To allow the states to litigate [the validity of federal 
law] . . . would be a fundamental denial of perhaps the most in-
novative principle of the Constitution: the principle that the fed-
eral government is a sovereign coexisting in the same territory 
with the states and acting . . . directly upon the citizenry . . . . For 
the national government is fully in privity with the people it gov-
erns, and needs, and should brook, no intermediaries.129 
As explained above, however, this Note declines to adopt pure 
popular sovereignty, instead arguing that states hold sovereign in-
terests independently—that they are not mere proxies for ulti-
mately popular power.130 But for reasons of ideology or simple un-
 
125 See Petitioner’s Brief at 7, Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970) (No. 42, 
Orig.), cited in Jacobs, supra note 120, at 238. 
126 See Laird, 400 U.S. at 886. 
127 Jacobs, supra note 120, at 229. 
128 See Laird, 400 U.S. at 887–91 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
129 Alexander M. Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, 1966 Sup. Ct. Rev. 79, 89 (dis-
cussing Supreme Court original jurisdiction but equally relevant here). 
130 See supra Subsection I.B.4; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 6, § 2.3.7 (“But a 
distinction can and has been drawn between instances where the government is pro-
tecting its own sovereign or proprietary interests and where it is suing on behalf of 
interests of its citizens.”). 
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certainty given the subject’s esoteric nature, several courts and 
commentators have failed to distinguish between quasi-sovereign 
interests as derivative and sovereign interests as independent when 
discussing parens patriae standing. The issues of federalism hinging 
on this distinction are sufficiently consequential to demand further 
exploration and, if possible, resolution. 
This Note proceeds to bring the historical background and judi-
cial doctrines outlined above to bear on its ultimate argument that 
the Mellon bar is inapplicable to states’ sovereignty-vindicating 
suits. Instead, the doctrine should exclusively block quasi-sovereign 
claims. The present Section concretizes this thesis with a simple ex-
ample and lays out its basic logic. Subsection II.D.1 then argues 
that the principle that Mellon is inapplicable to sovereign standing 
both comports with and clarifies Supreme Court precedent, helping 
to untangle the incoherence identified above. Subsections II.D.2 
through II.D.4 buttress this descriptive, precedential argument 
with a sampling of the principle’s policy merits, arguing that the in-
applicability of Mellon to sovereign standing is a normatively de-
sirable rule. 
In order conceptually to sharpen the argument that Mellon is in-
applicable to sovereignty-vindicating claims, imagine a stylized 
situation. Congressional Statute A institutes a federal policy direc-
tive. State Statute B directly conflicts with it. The state concedes 
that, if Congressional Statute A is constitutional, State Statute B is 
invalid under the Supremacy Clause, yet it disputes the constitu-
tionality of Congressional Statute A. Can the state bring suit 
against the federal government (or one of its officials) in order to 
vindicate its sovereign interest in—to quote Alfred L. Snapp—“the 
power to create and enforce a legal code” as embodied by State 
Statute B?131 
 
131 See Alfred L. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601. Whether the state has a litigable sovereign 
interest even absent the existence of State Statute B presents a fascinating further 
question—albeit one that this Note does not directly confront. I am indebted to Pro-
fessor Kevin Walsh for alerting me to the point that a potentially unconstitutional 
federal statute may arguably infringe a state’s interest in creating (as opposed to en-
forcing or defending) a legal code regardless of whether a conflicting state statute is 
on the books. Cf. Brad Joondeph, Why the States Lack Standing to Challenge the 
Minimum Coverage Provision, ACA Litig. Blog (Feb. 2, 2011, 10:05 AM), 
http://acalitigationblog.blogspot.com/2011/02/why-states-lack-standing-to-
challenge.html (“[I]f the states have standing here, they always have standing, at 
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The Supremacy Clause establishes that the “Constitution, and 
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance 
thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in 
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwith-
standing.”132 By its own terms, therefore, the Supremacy Clause is 
inapplicable to statutes not made in pursuance of the Constitution. 
Yet if Mellon prohibits the state’s challenge in the above example, 
an unconstitutional federal statute could invalidate a constitutional 
state statute—a result manifestly inconsistent with the clause’s text. 
Taken to the logical extreme, such instances (where the Mellon bar 
might preclude a sovereignty-vindicating claim against the federal 
government) threaten to destroy the state’s essential lawmaking or 
other jurisdictional prerogatives, potentially violating the Constitu-
tion’s rule of sovereign self-preservation133 and the Supreme 
Court’s pronouncement that “neither government may destroy the 
other.”134 
Each step in the logical argument advanced by this Note has now 
been laid out. Sovereign and quasi-sovereign interests are differ-
ent: the first are held by the state independently, the second in its 
representational capacity for the protection of its citizens. Parens 
patriae and quasi-sovereign standing are interchangeable in this 
context; they are synonymous. A state thus sues as parens patriae 
only when it pursues quasi-sovereign claims, not sovereign ones. 
The Mellon bar, which by definition addresses only parens patriae 
suits, is therefore wholly inapplicable to claims premised upon sov-
ereign interests. Were Mellon to apply to such, states would be left 
essentially unable to defend the most basic aspects of their sover-
eignty against ever-expanding federal power. 
 
every moment, in every case, to challenge any federal statute that is regulating any 
conduct within their borders. Why? . . . By enacting a federal regulatory scheme that 
regulates . . . in a different way than the state does, the federal government is now in-
terfering with the state’s ability to ‘enforce’ its own law—which may be no regulation 
whatsoever.”). 
132 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 
133 See supra note 12. 
134 See Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523 (1926). 
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D. Merits of Mellon’s Inapplicability 
Existing Supreme Court rulings support the inapplicability of 
Mellon to sovereign standing, as do powerful normative arguments. 
1. Comporting with and Clarifying Supreme Court Precedent 
Mellon does not state outright to which interests—sovereign, 
quasi-sovereign, or both—its parens patriae bar applies, nor are its 
progeny outlined in Subsection II.B.2 any more explicit. Careful 
analysis of these opinions, however, supports the proposition that 
the bar prohibits quasi-sovereign standing only. 
Mellon itself endorses this principle through unstated but impor-
tant indicators.135 In particular, it declared that Massachusetts’s 
Tenth Amendment claim on its own behalf involved “not rights of 
person or property, not rights of dominion over physical domain, 
not quasi-sovereign rights actually invaded or threatened, but ab-
stract questions of political power, of sovereignty, of govern-
ment”—thus expressly separating quasi-sovereign from sovereign 
interests.136 Prior to articulating the parens patriae bar, it disposed 
of this sovereign claim under Stanton’s dwindling political question 
rule,137 implying that the remaining, representative interests were 
something other than sovereign—quasi-sovereign.138 It is to these 
interests only that the parens patriae bar applied.139 
Cases applying Mellon follow the same pattern, using its jurisdic-
tional bar to prohibit quasi-sovereign claims only and considering 
alleged sovereign injuries separately. In the subsequent Florida 
case, for example, the Court expressly exercised the bar against the 
State’s asserted parens patriae claims.140 But it took up Florida’s 
sovereignty-based claims separately, ruling that sovereign interests 
 
135 See Mellon, 262 U.S. at 484–86. 
136 Id. at 484–85 (emphases added). 
137 See 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 77–78. 
138 See Mellon, 262 U.S. at 485 (applying Stanton and then turning to “whether the 
suit may be maintained by the State as the representative of its citizens”). 
139 See id. at 485–86. Moreover, in explaining parens patriae standing, the Court 
stated that “the State, under some circumstances, may sue in that capacity for the pro-
tection of its citizens.” Id. at 485 (citing Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1900)). 
Missouri, of course, is considered a classical statement—and indeed a point of ori-
gin—of quasi-sovereign standing. See supra text accompanying note 56. 
140 See Florida, 273 U.S. at 18. 
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do not afford a basis to challenge a federal law previously ruled 
constitutional.141 In thus addressing constitutionality, the Court 
reached the merits of the sovereignty-based claim, implicitly grant-
ing standing. Consequently, if a determination has not been made 
as to whether a congressional statute qualifies as “a law of the 
United States made in pursuance of the Constitution and, there-
fore, the supreme law of the land”142—if this is the question at issue 
in the case at bar, such as in the stylized example in the previous 
Section—the supremacy question remains open. 
In interpreting Florida, it is of critical importance that Justice 
Sutherland, paralleling his Mellon majority opinion, treated the 
questions of sovereign and parens patriae standing separately: he 
did not simply apply the Mellon bar to both. Similarly, in Katzen-
bach, the Court dismissed the State’s three parens patriae claims 
under Mellon but proceeded to the merits of its two sovereignty-
vindicating claims, clearly indicating that standing existed.143 As in 
Florida, this disparate treatment signaled that a state does not act 
as parens patriae when pursuing purely sovereign interests. 
In Laird, Massachusetts did not even attempt to allege sovereign 
injuries, raising only proprietary and quasi-sovereign claims.144 The 
former appear to have collapsed into the latter, making the Mellon 
bar applicable in toto. As one commentator reasons, in claiming 
that its economy and fisc would suffer from the war, “the State is in 
fact discussing the injuries suffered by its citizens, a circumstance 
which only indirectly affects the State. . . . Massachusetts’ argument 
for standing is based in actuality upon the rights of its citizens.”145 
Even if that argument does not mesh seamlessly with this Note’s 
rejection of pure popular sovereignty, the Commonwealth here 
simply did not attempt to assert a sovereign interest in making and 
enforcing the statute at issue. Thus, as in Florida and Katzenbach, 
the Mellon bar did not operate upon sovereign interests (assuming, 
based on the Douglas dissent, that Mellon was indeed the basis for 
this unexplained decision).  
 
141 See id. at 17. 
142 See id. 
143 See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 323–29. 
144 See Jacobs, supra note 120, at 238. 
145 Id. at 239. 
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Cementing this argument is the fact that the Supreme Court has 
neither exercised nor even mentioned the Mellon bar in several 
cases raising claims indubitably sovereign in nature.146 
One cannot close a discussion of parens patriae doctrine without 
looking to Alfred L. Snapp, though it references the Mellon bar 
only in dictum: “A State does not have standing as parens patriae 
to bring an action against the Federal Government.”147 What is sig-
nificant, of course, is that the same opinion unequivocally defines 
parens patriae standing as applying  exclusively to quasi-sovereign 
claims, plainly indicating that Mellon’s jurisdictional bar precludes 
only such suits.148 As asserted above, this decision should remain 
controlling as precedent directly demarcating the general ambit of 
parens patriae standing. 
Since the mid-nineteenth century, the scope of sovereign state 
standing has continually widened. To retract it now would be not 
only unwarranted but, in the face of such strong contrary prece-
dent, especially dubious. In sum, the rule should be that the Mellon 
bar applies to quasi-sovereign interests only, not sovereign inter-
ests; this principle both comports with and clarifies a long line of 
Supreme Court precedent. 
2. Analogizing to the Supremacy Clause 
The logic underlying the Supremacy Clause also supports the 
applicability of Mellon to quasi-sovereign standing only. To the ex-
tent that a state’s assertion of quasi-sovereign standing constitutes 
an exercise of its police power, it can be conceptualized as fitting 
within the margins of the state’s legislative jurisdiction or at least 
being analogous to it. The Supreme Court has lent credence to this 
proposition, suggesting that a “helpful indication in determining 
whether an alleged injury to the health and welfare of its citizens 
suffices to give the State standing to sue as parens patriae is 
whether the injury is one that the State, if it could, would likely at-
 
146 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187–88 (1992) (accepting ar-
gument that congressional enactment violated the Tenth Amendment despite New 
York’s failure to allege proprietary injury); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 118 
(1970) (accepting argument that the Constitution gives states control over election 
procedures despite Oregon’s failure to allege proprietary injury). 
147 Alfred L. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 610 n.16. 
148 See id. at 600–01. 
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tempt to address through its sovereign lawmaking powers”—that 
is, legislatively.149 
To the extent that the assertion of a quasi-sovereign interest re-
sembles the assertion of a policy interest through legislation, there-
fore, it is perfectly appropriate that, where the policy-making pow-
ers of federal and state governments overlap, federal law will stand 
supreme. The Mellon bar can thus be seen as producing the same 
result as the Supremacy Clause—or, from a high level of abstrac-
tion, as springing directly from it. This result does not follow in the 
case of sovereign interests, however, which states hold as a matter 
of fundamental constitutional law.150 Unlike in the realm of legisla-
tive-like policy choices, the federal government has no constitu-
tional authority to preempt the state’s basic sovereign functions. 
3. Removing Needless Formalism 
As suggested above, where a state alleges that sovereign inter-
ests are at stake, it will often be able also to declare proprietary in-
juries and/or join other plaintiffs with stronger claims to standing.151 
Even in its early days, the Supreme Court proved willing to adjudi-
cate issues of sovereignty incidental to more traditional claims.152 
Arguably, therefore, all the fuss over distinguishing the litigability 
of various classes of state interests often represents needless for-
malism. Professor Henry Monaghan makes this point while prais-
ing the trend toward embracing sovereign standing—characterizing 
as “extraordinary” the initial rejection of federalism claims raised 
by states themselves, such as in Stanton, but simultaneous sanction 
of the litigation of such issues between private parties: “Surely the 
reasoning of these decisions is wholly unsatisfactory,” he declares, 
because “the real contestants were Congress and the states.”153 
Thus, for courts to insist upon the addition of otherwise unnec-
essary plaintiffs or claims to ensure the presence of a proprietary 
injury each time a state alleges sovereign injury against the federal 
 
149 See id. at 607. 
150 See supra note 12. 
151 See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
152 See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text. 
153 Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 Yale 
L.J. 1363, 1367–68 (1973); see also Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 9, at 436 & 
n.192. 
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government would often be overly formalistic, wasting the time 
and resources of the courts, the states, and the ancillary plaintiffs. 
Additional parties and claims change little about the way such suits 
are actually litigated—as federalism contests between states and 
the federal government. Likewise, this reasoning holds when pro-
prietary claims are unavailable. Where an important question of 
federalism implicating an independent state interest arises, the 
state should be able to litigate it directly, regardless of whether the 
injured interest is proprietary or sovereign. To hold otherwise may 
elevate form over substance to a dangerous degree. 
While shifts in the law from formalism to functionalism are not 
necessarily unqualified goods, for this particular issue the benefits 
far outweigh the costs given the substantial federalism values at 
stake. To rebuild toppled formalist walls in the context of the Mel-
lon bar would be an unfortunate regression. 
4. Responding to Counterarguments 
Because they approach the matter from a popular sovereigntist 
viewpoint, Woolhandler and Collins advocate scaling back sover-
eign standing across the board, accordingly contending that the 
Mellon bar should prohibit both quasi-sovereign and sovereign 
claims in all but the most egregious incidents. Defending the Su-
preme Court’s early hostility to sovereign state standing (which ac-
cords with their popular sovereigntist stance), they argue that di-
recting disputes over state sovereignty “to suits between 
individuals and government rather than to suits between govern-
ments” was a “normative[ly] attracti[ve]” approach.154 Specifically, 
they assert that the Court’s early doctrine of allowing individuals 
only—not states—to litigate critical issues of state sovereignty rein-
forced federalism values, individual rights, and the separation of 
powers. 
a. Federalism Values 
As Woolhandler and Collins explain, the early Court considered 
individuals “the proper parties to challenge legislation, and it re-
fused to consider suits between . . . two governments based solely 
 
154 Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 9, at 435, 439. 
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on their regulation of the same individuals. Stated differently, the 
Court found no legal relationship between the two competing gov-
ernments.”155 This, they claim, “reinforced the systemic federalism 
principle that the federal and state governments acted primarily on 
the people directly rather than upon each other.”156 This argument 
rings with a clear popular sovereignty tone. But if governments 
have interests independent of their citizens’ interests, as argued 
here, there is no reason why they should be unable to invoke them 
defensively qua governments. 
Moreover—and arguably the strongest policy argument support-
ing the inapplicability of Mellon to sovereign standing—federalism 
issues will be litigated most aggressively by states themselves. Indi-
viduals are a grossly inadequate substitute when it comes to assert-
ing the structural constitutional protections underlying state sover-
eignty. Their interests do not align perfectly with those of the 
states, and they possess neither the incentives nor the resources to 
pursue sovereignty claims as effectively. As the Supreme Court 
stated in a slightly different context, “[b]ecause the State alone is 
entitled to create a legal code, only the State has the kind of ‘direct 
stake’ [necessary for] defending” it.157 It is thus largely counterpro-
ductive for Woolhandler and Collins to argue on federalism 
grounds for a result that will likely hurt the possibility of achieving 
full, fair, and forceful litigation of federalism disputes. 
b. Separation of Powers 
Woolhandler and Collins further argue that the previous non-
litigability of sovereign interests reinforced the separation of pow-
ers component of Article III’s “case or controversy” requirement 
by “closely track[ing] the prohibition on litigating questions of the 
constitutionality of statutes simpliciter.”158 That is, “[a]n abstract 
decision on the legality of a state or federal legislature’s exercise of 
power would have lacked the traditional components of a cause of 
action: damage or threatened injury to what the Court would have 
considered a litigable interest.”159 Prohibiting sovereign standing, 
 
155 Id. at 439. 
156 Id. 
157 Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 65 (1986) (citation omitted). 
158 Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 9, at 440. 
159 Id. at 440–41. 
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they claim, thus serves to “minimiz[e] direct clashes between the 
judiciary and other branches of government,” reinforcing the sepa-
ration of powers.160 
This argument is both circular (essentially stating that certain in-
terests were not litigable because “the Court would [not] have con-
sidered [them] litigable”) and proves too much. The doctrine 
against litigating the constitutionality of statutes simpliciter already 
does the work for which Woolhandler and Collins advocate. De-
claring additional sovereign interests non-litigable is thus overin-
clusive, particularly given that the injury component of the case or 
controversy requirement retains content protective of the separa-
tion of powers in addition to its subsidiary interest inquiry.161  
Finally, the Court’s previous practice of labeling issues of sover-
eignty “political questions” only for state plaintiffs (while allowing 
individuals to pursue them) was largely disingenuous, simply insu-
lating the judiciary from political actors rather than serving separa-
tion of powers principles on a deeper level.162 
c. Individual Rights 
The Court’s early refusal to grant sovereign standing forced ad-
judication of the constitutionality of statutes into the individual en-
forcement realm.163 That is, a statute’s constitutionality could only 
be questioned by an individual against whom the government at-
tempted to enforce it, with the government acting defensively. Ap-
plied to the scenario hypothesized above, the state would simply 
have to wait for an individual against whom the federal govern-
ment attempted to enforce Congressional Statute A to challenge its 
constitutionality and then hope that he or she effectively raised 
structural federalism arguments. 
Woolhandler and Collins argue that allowing only individuals to 
raise sovereignty arguments “expresses that individuals are the[ir] 
 
160 Id. at 441. 
161 That is, there is more to proving a cognizable injury than simply asserting the vio-
lation of a litigable interest; one must also prove, for instance, that the injury is suffi-
ciently “concrete” and “particularized.” See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
162 See Monaghan, supra note 153, at 1368 n.29. 
163 Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 9, at 439. 
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intended beneficiaries.”164 Consequently, they continue, permitting 
state standing outside of the proprietary context dilutes claims of 
individual rights by equating state power with right: “The freedom 
of government thus spar[s] with the freedom from government.”165 
First and most critically, while this argument may be relevant for 
quasi-sovereign suits against private defendants, it is largely inap-
plicable to sovereign suits, which, by definition, are brought vis-à-
vis other governments. Second, leaving aside the question whether 
states can have “rights” in the same manner as individuals, the 
Constitution’s structural constitutive rules do protect states qua 
states, imparting them sovereign interests.166 
In order to preclude this alleged dilution of individual rights, 
Woolhandler and Collins propose limiting sovereign standing to a 
very narrowly defined group of state interests.167 Interests that de-
rive from the Constitution must emanate from an explicit provi-
sion—not from the general structural protections discussed 
above,168 which they insist “ordinarily belong to [the] people.”169 
Moreover, where individuals have incentives to sue, states gener-
ally should not be able to do so, they claim.170 They therefore char-
acterize the Mellon bar as allowing sovereign state standing only 
where either a rare constitutional provision explicitly protecting 
state authority is involved171 or where a federal statute, on its face, 
operates directly upon the states.172 Only then, they argue, do states 
assert their “own legally protected interests” instead of “general-
ized federalism claims.”173 
 
164 Id. at 440. The Supreme Court bolstered this view last term in Bond v. United 
States, holding that a criminal defendant had standing to argue that a statute under 
which she was prosecuted was unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment, which 
the United States argued could be invoked only by states. See 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2360 
(2011). Bond does not resolve the question presented here, though, concerning 
whether and when states—apart from individuals—can themselves make state sover-
eignty-related claims. 
165 Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 9, at 482–83 (emphasis omitted). 
166 See supra note 12. 
167 See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 9, at 504–10. 
168 See supra note 12. 
169 Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 9, at 506–07. 
170 See id. at 507–08. 
171 See id. at 492–94. 
172 See id. at 508–10. 
173 Id. at 504–10. 
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This argument not only mischaracterizes Mellon, it is profoundly 
unfair to the states. First, it directly contravenes Alfred L. Snapp’s 
recognition of certain sovereign interests as independent based 
upon just such generalized federalism grounds.174 Second, when it 
comes to asserting the structural protections underlying state sov-
ereignty, individuals are simply not an equal substitute for states, 
as discussed above in Subsection II.D.4.a—an important concern 
where critical federalism issues may be involved. 
All in all, the arguments that Woolhandler and Collins marshal 
for returning to the Supreme Court’s long-abandoned early state 
standing regime are unpersuasive as applied to sovereign standing 
because they too easily disregard states’ important sovereign inter-
ests and the constitutional provisions protecting them. 
III. APPLICATION: THE VIRGINIA HEALTHCARE CHALLENGE AND 
BEYOND 
Currently pending before federal courts across the nation are 
numerous suits seeking the invalidation of the “individual man-
date” component of the federal healthcare reform package enacted 
in early 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(“PPACA”),175 yet two state-initiated suits have commanded the 
bulk of media and scholarly attention.176 This Part demonstrates the 
practical importance of this Note’s thesis by applying it to the Vir-
ginia-instigated PPACA challenge, where the issues discussed here 
have been litigated with the most clarity and depth. Subsection 
III.A.1 outlines the sovereign standing dimensions of this dispute, 
and Subsection III.A.2 follows with an analysis of the arguments 
proffered by Virginia and the United States, applying the interpre-
tation of the Mellon bar endorsed above to conclude that standing 
should be granted.177 Finally, Section III.B scrutinizes the debate 
 
174 See Alfred L. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601. 
175 Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501, 124 Stat. 119, 242–49 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 18091 (Supp. IV 2011), 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (Supp. IV 2011)). 
176 Because it was the first appellate decision on the matter, the Sixth Circuit opinion 
in Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, No. 10-2388, 2011 WL 2556039 (6th Cir. June 
29, 2011), has also received a great deal of press. 
177 In arguing that Virginia has standing to pursue this challenge, this Part specifi-
cally focuses on the standing issue addressed throughout this Note—the interest com-
ponent of the injury in fact requirement. Moreover, this is the justiciability question 
upon which the parties and courts have expended the most energy to date. Other jus-
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surrounding courts’ tolerance for such “manufactured” sovereign 
standing. 
A. Sovereign Standing in the Virginia Healthcare Challenge 
1. Introducing the Issue 
Prior to a recent Fourth Circuit ruling discussed below, few real-
ized that such a seemingly esoteric issue of federal jurisdictional ju-
risprudence as whether the Mellon bar bans sovereignty-
vindicating claims could unceremoniously extinguish one of the 
most-hyped lawsuits of the new millennium. A handful of academ-
ics had begun to take note, uniformly coming to a conclusion on 
standing contrary to that advocated here.178 
The story began in March 2010. Virginia Attorney General Ken 
Cuccinelli stood at Governor Bob McDonnell’s elbow as McDon-
nell signed into law the Virginia Health Care Freedom Act 
(“VHCFA”),179 a direct response to the individual mandate com-
ponent of PPACA, which was awaiting final passage in Congress at 
the time VHCFA cleared the state legislature. VHCFA provides 
that “[n]o resident of this Commonwealth . . . shall be required to 
obtain or maintain a policy of individual [health] insurance cover-
age.”180 Requiring individuals to maintain health insurance is, of 
course, precisely what PPACA’s individual mandate does.181 Cuc-
cinelli filed suit in federal court, demanding judicial declaration 
 
ticiability issues are beyond the scope of the analysis here. For a variety of such argu-
ments, see Kevin C. Walsh, The Ghost That Slayed the Mandate, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1748550. 
178 See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Kevin C. Walsh in Support of Appellant Seek-
ing Reversal at 12, 20–21, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, No. 11-1057, 2011 WL 
3925617 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011) (relying upon Mellon as part of a more elaborate ju-
risdictional analysis concluding that Virginia’s suit should be dismissed), petition for 
cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 468 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2011) (No. 11-420); Brief of Amici Curiae 
Professors of Federal Jurisdiction in Support of Appellant at 2, Virginia, No. 11-1057, 
2011 WL 3925617 [hereinafter Brief of Professors] (urging the court to apply the Mel-
lon bar based on the popular sovereigntist argument that “the Constitution’s struc-
tural guarantees exist to protect individuals, and not the sovereignty of the states as 
such”); see also Walsh, supra note 177, at 6–7. 
179 Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-3430.1:1 (West Supp. 2011). 
180 Id. 
181 See Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501, 124 Stat. 119, 242–49 (2010) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 18091 (Supp. IV 2011), 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (Supp. IV 2011)). 
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that PPACA is “unconstitutional [as] exceed[ing] the enumerated 
powers conferred upon Congress.”182 Twenty-six other states did 
the same, seeking the invalidation of PPACA in federal district 
court in Florida. Both cases—Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Se-
belius183 (in which the defendant is Kathleen Sebelius, the Secretary 
of the federal Department of Health and Human Services) and 
Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Ser-
vices184—resulted in district court rulings declaring PPACA uncon-
stitutional as exceeding Congress’s commerce power. The Fourth 
Circuit recently rejected the Virginia challenge on precisely the 
standing grounds discussed here, reversing the district court’s de-
nial of the Secretary’s motion to dismiss, whereas the Eleventh 
Circuit affirmed the multi-state Florida challenge in the first appel-
late decision finding that PPACA indeed oversteps Congress’s 
constitutional bounds.185 It is widely agreed that the Supreme Court 
will likely hear one or both this term (especially given the split now 
posed by the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits’ decisions on PPACA’s 
constitutionality186). 
While these state-as-plaintiff cases have raised a variety of stand-
ing issues, the propriety of sovereign state standing to challenge 
federal law has been a focal point in the Virginia suit.187 Virginia’s 
argument for standing is precisely that explored in the stylized ex-
ample set out in Section II.C: Congressional Statute A is PPACA; 
State Statute B is VHCFA. Virginia argues that an unconstitu-
 
182 Complaint at 6, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. 
Va. 2010) (No. 3:10CV188-HEH), rev’d, 2011 WL 3925617 (4th Cir. 2011) [hereinaf-
ter Virginia Complaint]. 
183 728 F. Supp. 2d at 768. 
184 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. Fla. 2011). 
185 See Virginia, 2011 WL 3925617; Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health 
& Human Servs., Nos. 11-11021 & 11-11067, 2011 WL 3519178, at *66–68 (11th Cir. 
Aug. 12, 2011). 
186 Compare id. (invalidating PPACA under the Commerce Clause), with Thomas 
More Law Ctr. v. Obama, No. 10-2388, 2011 WL 2556039, at *1 (6th Cir. June 29, 
2011) (upholding PPACA under the Commerce Clause). 
187 Though several states involved in the Florida suit also enacted statutes similar to 
VHCFA, they have played almost no role in that litigation. The reason seems to be 
that the state plaintiffs, in addition to raising sovereignty-vindicating claims, chose 
both to assert proprietary claims and to join individual plaintiffs with proprietary 
claims of their own, all but assuring themselves standing. See Amended Complaint at 
14–19, Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. 
Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (No. 3:10-cv-91 RV/EMT). 
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tional federal law cannot invalidate an otherwise constitutional 
state law under the Supremacy Clause and that such would be in-
imical to Virginia’s fundamental sovereign ability to make and en-
force a legal code.188 The Commonwealth thus insists that it has 
sovereign standing to challenge PPACA.189 
Before proceeding to assess this argument, it is worthwhile to 
clarify precisely what is and is not at stake in Virginia’s claim to 
sovereign standing. It bears emphasis that the suit is not really 
about whether VHCFA, standing alone, is constitutional.190 The 
question, rather, is whether it is invalid under the Supremacy 
Clause, which turns on whether PPACA is constitutional. More-
over, in making its case, Virginia raises sovereignty arguments on 
two entirely separate levels: standing and the merits. 
Virginia first claims sovereign standing.191 If and only if standing 
exists is Virginia free to raise a variety of arguments regarding 
PPACA’s constitutional merits. Appreciating the distinction be-
tween the standing and merits phases here is critical because Vir-
 
188 See Virginia Complaint, supra note 182, at 3; Virginia, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 771–72. 
189 Virginia appears to have made a strategic and symbolic decision to hinge standing 
entirely upon sovereign interests, foregoing plausible proprietary claims based on 
changes to Medicaid and declining to join individual plaintiffs—notably, both strate-
gies that the Florida suit’s state plaintiffs have successfully pursued. See Florida ex rel. 
Att’y Gen., 2011 WL 3519178, at *3 (recognizing that “the question of the state plain-
tiffs’ standing to challenge the individual mandate is an interesting and difficult one, 
[but] in the posture of this case, it is purely academic” and concluding that “[b]ecause 
it is beyond dispute that at least one plaintiff has standing to raise each claim here—
the individual plaintiffs . . . have standing to challenge the individual mandate, and the 
state plaintiffs undeniably have standing to challenge the Medicaid provisions—this 
case is justiciable”). In contrast, the sole basis for standing asserted in Virginia’s com-
plaint was its “interest in asserting the validity” of VHCFA, which it argues “is valid 
despite the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution because . . . the indi-
vidual mandate and PPACA as a whole are unconstitutional.” Virginia Complaint, 
supra note 182, at 3. Attorney General Cuccinelli, a darling of Tea Party “states’ 
rights” enthusiasts, has clearly signaled that he intends to make state sovereignty a 
central component of the lawsuit’s legal and political messages. 
190 Virginia does, however, ask for a declaration of VHCFA’s constitutionality, Vir-
ginia Complaint, supra note 182, at 6, which is perhaps unwise given the arguable ban 
against such declaratory rulings, see Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation 
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1983). 
191 See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 11–12, Vir-
ginia, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (No. 3:10CV188-HEH) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Memoran-
dum]. 
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ginia does indeed argue issues of state sovereignty in both,192 poten-
tially obscuring the fact that the two inquiries are distinct. Conse-
quently, for a court to recognize Virginia’s standing articulates 
relatively little—and nothing novel or politically inflammatory—
about the general content of state sovereignty. It pronounces nei-
ther that PPACA oversteps Congress’s enumerated powers, that 
the Tenth Amendment reserves the regulation of healthcare to the 
states, that states can nullify federal enactments, nor that VHCFA 
is even enforceable standing alone. Recognizing standing merely 
acknowledges that Virginia has a litigable sovereign interest in de-
fending a duly enacted state code section against a federal statute 
that purports to invalidate it, simply allowing Virginia to obtain a 
ruling on whether that federal statute is in fact valid law. 
2. Applying the Precedent 
a. The District Court’s Recognition of Standing 
The first flashpoint for the issue of Virginia’s sovereign standing 
was the motion to dismiss stage in the district court. Secretary Se-
belius (“the Secretary”) argued that Virginia had alleged no cogni-
zable “injury to its own interests as a state” and is thus suing 
merely on behalf of its citizens as parens patriae.193 Virginia’s com-
plaint does assert that “PPACA imposes immediate and continuing 
burdens on Virginia and its citizens.”194 Without more, this may 
have constituted a quasi-sovereign claim, an argument to which the 
Secretary clung in demanding that the court exercise the Mellon 
bar.195 
 
192 Its main merits contentions, that PPACA exceeds Congress’s authority under the 
Commerce Clause and the Taxing and Spending Clause, assert state sovereignty indi-
rectly on the theory that all powers not enumerated as congressional were retained by 
the sovereign states. See id. at 28–39. Virginia has even briefly advanced a “traditional 
state power[s]” theory, see id. at 15, apparently attempting to resurrect the Tenth 
Amendment interpretation abandoned by Garcia v. San Antonio Transportation Au-
thority, see 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985). 
193  Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 10, Virginia, 728 
F. Supp. 2d 768 (No. 3:10CV188-HEH) [hereinafter Defendant’s Memorandum]. 
194 Virginia Complaint, supra note 182, at 2 (emphasis added). 
195 See Defendant’s Memorandum, supra note 193, at 11–12. 
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Virginia responded by denying that it sought parens patriae 
standing, acknowledging that Mellon would prohibit such a claim.196 
Instead, Virginia asserted, it brought suit to vindicate its sovereign 
interests only: under Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex 
rel. Barez, it argued, states have a litigable sovereign interest in 
creating and enforcing a legal code, and an injury to that interest 
occurs if a Virginia statute must give way to an invalid federal en-
actment.197 Consequently, “[b]ecause the operation of PPACA vio-
lates Virginia’s sovereignty by purportedly invalidating a Virginia 
statute under the Supremacy Clause, Virginia has standing in this 
action.”198 Though it did not phrase the matter in such a straight-
forward manner, the Commonwealth thus adopted this Note’s ar-
gument that sovereign claims fall outside the purview of parens pa-
triae standing and, therefore, are untouched by Mellon. 
The Secretary countered that questions of sovereignty are not 
adjudicable because they pose political questions, apparently rely-
ing on the Supreme Court’s abandoned Georgia v. Stanton doc-
trine.199 She also argued that Virginia cannot manufacture sover-
eign standing by crafting a statute that conflicts with a 
congressional enactment, citing Florida v. Mellon for the proposi-
tion that state law “must yield” under the Supremacy Clause.200 As 
specified above, however, Florida declares only that state statutes 
must yield where congressional pronouncements are constitu-
tional,201 an open question of merit in the Virginia healthcare chal-
lenge. Virginia does not claim that VHCFA nullifies an otherwise 
valid federal law; it merely asserts that VHCFA provides standing 
to question whether PPACA is in fact valid. 
Judge Hudson agreed with Virginia. Relying on Alfred L. Snapp, 
he separated sovereign from quasi-sovereign interests, indicated 
that parens patriae standing applies solely to the latter, and found 
 
196 Plaintiff’s Memorandum, supra note 191, at 12. 
197 See id. at 12, 15–16. 
198 Id. at 16. 
199 See Defendant’s Memorandum, supra note 193, at 14. 
200 Id. (citing Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 17 (1927)). 
201 See supra note 141 and accompanying text. The Secretary’s other citations on this 
issue face the same problem. See Defendant’s Memorandum, supra note 193, at 14–
15. In Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 644–45 (1937), and New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 
U.S. 328, 337 (1926), the Court first held the congressional enactments constitution-
ally valid and only then declared their supremacy. 
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that Virginia’s suit implicates sovereign interests only.202 Mellon is 
therefore inapplicable, and the Commonwealth has standing to 
sue, he held.203 
Finally, the Secretary attempted to resuscitate her argument for 
imposing the Mellon bar by claiming that VHCFA’s sole purpose is 
to protect Virginians from PPACA, with Virginia thus smuggling a 
quasi-sovereign claim inside a sovereign one.204 Hudson was un-
moved: 
Although this lawsuit has the collateral effect of protecting the 
individual interests of the citizens of the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia, its primary articulated objective is to defend the Virginia 
Health Care Freedom Act from the conflicting effect of an alleg-
edly unconstitutional federal law. Despite its declaratory nature, 
it is a lawfully-enacted part of the laws of Virginia. The pur-
ported transparent legislative intent underlying its enactment is 
irrelevant.205 
The court’s rejection of the Secretary’s argument reflects the fact 
that there is no precedent for looking behind a sovereign claim to 
the purpose of the code section that the state attempts to protect. 
Virginia seeks to vindicate its sovereign power to make and en-
force a legal code at large, not the purpose or policies underlying 
the specific enactment at issue. Although the purposes of the con-
flicting state statute may become relevant at a later stage of pre-
emption analysis,206 the Supremacy Clause is flatly inapplicable if 
the congressional statute at issue fails to qualify under its text as a 
“Law[] of the United States made in pursuance [of the Constitu-
tion].”207 
 
202 See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 605–07 (E.D. Va. 
2010), summary judgment granted, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
203 See id. at 607. 
204 See Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 3–5, 
Virginia, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (No. 3:10CV188-HEH). 
205 Virginia, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 605. 
206 See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (articulating the test for im-
plied conflict preemption as where a state law “stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,” which can 
turn upon the conflicting state law’s own purposes). 
207 See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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While the district court thus resolved Virginia’s claim to sover-
eign standing in a manner generally consistent with the approach 
advanced in this Note, the rationale and rightness of its decision 
proved unclear to many, and Mellon’s applicability remains hotly 
contested on appeal. 
b. The Fourth Circuit’s Reversal 
With the most recent ruling in the Virginia healthcare challenge, 
the question of state standing has returned to the fore. A Fourth 
Circuit panel, speaking unanimously through Judge Motz, disposed 
of Virginia’s suit on grounds addressed directly by this Note, hold-
ing that the Commonwealth lacks a sufficient sovereign interest 
and that Mellon thus forecloses its suit.208 While the opinion does 
not lack for rhetorical flourish, careful analysis shows its conclu-
sions to be ill-supported. 
The court rested its decision on three main points. First, appar-
ently accepting the Secretary’s unsubstantiated contention that 
states possess sovereign standing to challenge preemption only 
with regard to laws that constitute some sort of real “regulatory 
scheme,”209 the court held that “Virginia lacks standing to challenge 
the individual mandate because the mandate threatens no interest 
in the ‘enforceability’ of the VHCFA.”210 This conclusion, it as-
serted, springs from Alfred L. Snapp’s explication of sovereign in-
terests as involving “the power to create and enforce a legal code,” 
with dispositive force placed upon the Supreme Court’s inclusion 
of the word “and.”211 That is, Judge Motz read Alfred L. Snapp as 
providing that “only when a federal law interferes with a state’s ex-
ercise of its sovereign ‘power to create and enforce a legal code’ 
 
208 Virginia, 2011 WL 3925617, at *3–5. 
209 See Brief for Appellant at 29, Virginia, No. 11-1057, 2011 WL 3925617 [hereinaf-
ter Secretary’s Brief]; see also audio recording: Oral Argument, Virginia, 2011 WL 
3925617 (4th Cir. May 20, 2011), http://coop.ca4.uscourts.gov/OAarchive/mp3/11-
1057-20110510.mp3 (admitting that states generally have “sovereign interests in de-
fending [their] own laws from federal preemption” and can thus “interven[e by] using 
[them]sel[ves] as a shield against some federal law that is coming in and displacing 
some regulatory scheme they have” but claiming that “here what the state has done is 
very different”). 
210 Virginia, 2011 WL 3925617, at *3 (emphasis added). 
211 See id. at *4 (quoting Alfred L. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601) (emphasis added by the 
Fourth Circuit). 
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does it inflict on the state the requisite injury-in-fact.”212 Because 
the VHCFA contains no obvious enforcement mechanism, the 
court found, its “mere existence” (in essence, Virginia’s reliance 
only upon its asserted sovereign power to create a legal code) is in-
sufficient.213 
As a textual matter, making one conjunction in one snippet of 
one Supreme Court opinion bear so much weight produces a 
strained and thus suspicious reading. As a matter of general lan-
guage and logic, we do not normally consider a person who exer-
cises only one of two joint abilities unauthorized to do so. If par-
ents tell a child that she can bake cookies and eat them, absent a 
clear admonition that she can bake if and only if she eats, we would 
not consider her to have acted rebelliously by doing only the for-
mer. Perhaps the cookies were inedible, but the child was not 
therefore disobedient. Moreover, the Fourth Circuit’s isolation of 
this single phrase from Alfred L. Snapp takes it entirely out of con-
text. As this Note’s discussion of the case makes manifest, the Al-
fred L. Snapp Court yoked the separate but closely related powers 
of creating and enforcing law together not to require them in com-
bination but to differentiate them from the distinct sovereign 
power of demanding recognition from other sovereigns.214 A much 
more natural reading of the language views a state’s “power to cre-
ate and enforce a legal code” as describing a lesser-within-the-
greater situation in which a state’s ability to enforce its statutes 
flows from its elemental power to create them. Regulation of tan-
gible programs or processes has never before been conceived as a 
prerequisite to every exercise of sovereignty. 
Relatedly, the opinion demonstrates a fundamental failure con-
ceptually to compartmentalize Virginia’s asserted sovereign inter-
ests from its merits arguments. As explained previously, Virginia 
does not purport to possess “sovereign authority to nullify federal 
law,”215 nor does it argue that it holds a “sovereign interest in the 
judicial invalidation of th[e] mandate.”216 Rather, the Common-
 
212 Id. 
213 See id. Query, however, whether Virginia filing this suit itself represents an atypi-
cal attempt at enforcement. 
214 See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
215 See Virginia, 2011 WL 3925617, at *4. 
216 See id. at *5. 
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wealth contends that it has a sovereign interest merely in the 
promulgation of its own legal code, which here provides it standing 
to question the validity of the individual mandate under the Consti-
tution. It is the Constitution, not the VHCFA, that renders the 
mandate’s legitimacy suspect, Virginia claims. 
Second, the court declared that “[g]iven that the VHCFA does 
nothing more than announce an unenforceable policy goal of pro-
tecting Virginia’s residents from federal insurance requirements, 
Virginia’s ‘real interest’ is not in the VHCFA itself, but rather in 
achieving this underlying goal.”217 It therefore found its inquiry 
whether “the VHCFA serves merely as a smokescreen for Vir-
ginia’s attempted vindication of its citizens’ interests”218 satisfied, 
accepting the Secretary’s argument that the Commonwealth seeks 
to litigate as parens patriae and is thus barred by Mellon.219 
The complete absence of precedent supporting the proposition 
that the validity of a sovereign claim rests upon the rationale un-
derlying the code section that the state attempts to protect fatally 
undermines this portion of the court’s analysis. As observed above, 
the initial applicability of the Supremacy Clause has never de-
pended upon the policy purposes of conflicting state statutes; in-
stead, it hinges solely upon whether the federal statute constitutes 
a “Law[] of the United States made in pursuance [of the Constitu-
tion].”220 The one case that Judge Motz cites for the declaration 
that a state cannot “escape th[e Mellon] bar merely by codifying its 
objection to the federal statute in question”221 does not involve 
state codification at all. Rather, relying particularly (though not ex-
clusively) upon Stanton, New Jersey v. Sargent dismissed a state’s 
challenge to the constitutionality of a federal statute founded upon 
an amorphous standing theory wholly unrelated to any actual state 
legislation.222 
 
217 Id. 
218 Id. at *3. 
219 See id. at *3, *5. 
220 See supra text accompanying note 207. 
221 See Virginia, 2011 WL 3925617, at *5. 
222 See New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U.S. 328, 330–31, 337–40 (1926). Though the 
Court did summarize Mellon in its exposition of the relevant case law, it was only at a 
very high level of generality and one that essentially begs the question presented in 
Virginia, stating that Mellon “dismiss[ed] a bill . . . not shown to affect prejudicially 
any . . . right of the State subject to judicial cognizance.” See id. at 334. There is no 
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Interestingly, as a centerpiece of its parens patriae argument, the 
federal government actually admitted that the case involves “not 
rights of person or property, not rights of dominion over physical 
domain, not quasi sovereign rights actually invaded or threatened, 
but abstract questions . . . of sovereignty, of government,” quoting 
Mellon and arguing that its parens patriae bar precludes standing.223 
The Secretary, however, clearly failed to appreciate a critical as-
pect of this passage. As discussed above,224 it comes from the por-
tion of Mellon declaring the state plaintiff’s sovereign claims invalid 
under Stanton’s political question rule, which was entirely distinct 
from the Supreme Court’s separate dismissal of the discrete parens 
patriae claims under Mellon’s eponymous jurisdictional bar. The 
Secretary’s brief neglected to reveal that the passage expressly re-
lies upon Stanton rather than the parens patriae bar—perhaps a 
tactical move given the Court’s marked turn away from that case. 
Unfortunately, the court likewise failed to make this distinction, 
employing a portion of the same quotation from Mellon when de-
claring Virginia’s challenge “an improper state parens patriae law-
suit.”225 
Finally, the court expressed extreme (and likely overblown, as 
explored below) anxiety concerning the specter of manufactured 
sovereign standing, an issue addressed anon in Section III.B.226 
While the Fourth Circuit’s decision is surely momentous for its 
novel take on state standing, it is universally believed that a final 
ruling on the individual mandate’s constitutionality will come from 
the Supreme Court.227 Less clear is when and how. Because the Su-
preme Court will have a variety of circuit court decisions among 
which to choose for review and because Virginia’s is the only suit 
in which sovereign state standing is a dispositive question, the 
 
indication that the Court actually applied Mellon’s parens patriae bar in Sargent; if 
anything, the connection seems to have arisen from Mellon’s reliance upon Stanton 
outside of the parens patriae context. See supra notes 136–39 and accompanying text. 
223 See Secretary’s Brief, supra note 209, at 26 (quoting Mellon, 262 U.S. at 484–85) 
(emphases added); see also Defendant’s Memorandum, supra note 193, at 14 (same). 
224 See supra notes 136–39 and accompanying text. 
225 See Virginia, 2011 WL 3925617, at *5. 
226 See id. at *6. 
227 See, e.g., Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, No. 10-2388, 2011 WL 2556039, at 
*23 (6th Cir. June 29, 2011) (Sutton, J., concurring) (“[W]e at the court of appeals are 
not just fallible but utterly non-final in this case.”). 
2011] Securing Sovereign State Standing 2099 
Court need not make any definite pronouncements upon this issue 
in order to decide PPACA’s constitutionality. No one can predict, 
however, whether it will seek to decide the issue anyway—or at 
least issue strong clarificatory dicta. Specifically, the Court could 
choose to hear the Virginia healthcare challenge itself and thus 
consider sovereign state standing directly, or alternatively, it could 
simply suggest its views on the matter in deciding another PPACA 
challenge. 
B. Manufactured Standing 
It would be naïve to ignore the potential for abuse inherent in 
the type of standing that Virginia claims. Of course the sole pur-
pose of VHCFA was to manufacture standing for the healthcare 
challenge (beyond, perhaps, some bare statement of principle), and 
arguably, as the Secretary alleges, “[i]f states could manufacture 
standing in the way Virginia attempts to do here, every policy dis-
pute lost in the legislative arena could be transformed into an issue 
for decision by the courts.”228 
The response is five-fold. First, the Secretary’s argument is 
alarmist. In reality, states intent on obtaining standing will almost 
always be able to plead proprietary injury to themselves or to sup-
plementary plaintiffs in addition to sovereign claims, as illustrated 
by the successful deployment of this exact strategy by the Florida 
healthcare challenge’s state plaintiffs. Officials like Cuccinelli—
apparently intent on asserting sovereign standing alone for sym-
bolic political reasons at the risk of his entire case—are assuredly 
rare. 
Second, even if allowing such standing does create a small uptick 
in suits, the constitutional benefits outweigh the practical costs: re-
specting states’ fundamental constitutional sovereignty is surely 
sufficient justification for tolerating a minor strain on the judiciary. 
Third, no Supreme Court case law points the way toward any 
workable distinction between statutes that states can defend 
against preemption and those that they cannot. Though VHCFA 
represents fairly obvious manufacturing, federal courts will rarely 
be able to divine legislative intent so clearly. A total lack of prece-
 
228 Defendant’s Memorandum, supra note 193, at 15; see also Brief of Professors, su-
pra note 178, at 27–30. 
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dent likewise undercuts the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion that courts 
should somehow cull state laws that appear not to constitute part 
of a real “regulatory scheme.”229 
Fourth, “ought” does not imply “is”: the fact that the Secretary’s 
policy argument may have some merit does not change the con-
trary state of the law—that Supreme Court precedent appears to 
accord Virginia sovereign standing. 
Finally, it bears emphasis that even if one is inclined to agree 
with the Secretary that manufactured sovereign standing is intoler-
able, the broader importance of recognizing Mellon’s inapplicabil-
ity to sovereign interests loses very little force because few cases 
that present this issue actually implicate such manufacturing. For 
instance, of the previous cases reviewed here, only Massachusetts v. 
Laird could raise similar misgivings.230 
CONCLUSION 
State sovereignty generally and sovereign state standing even 
more so are poorly understood ideas. This Note has sought to shed 
light and spark commentary upon previously unexplored intricacies 
of these concepts, arguing that sovereign state standing provides an 
important means by which states can claim their rightful position in 
the American constitutional scheme. 
To that end, this Note has presented the first in-depth analysis 
and attempted resolution of the pervasive confusion underlying the 
application of Massachusetts v. Mellon’s jurisdictional bar, which 
prohibits state parens patriae suits meant to shield citizens from 
federal laws. It has argued that sovereign and quasi-sovereign state 
interests are meaningfully distinct—the first independent and the 
second derivative—and that, for reasons of both precedent and 
policy, courts should apply Mellon only to quasi-sovereign claims. 
Virginia’s challenge to federal healthcare reform sharpens and con-
textualizes these issues, revealing them simultaneously to represent 
immediate flashpoints and fundamental questions of American 
federalism. Ultimately, because Virginia asserts independent sov-
ereign interests expressly recognized by Supreme Court precedent, 
the Mellon bar should not foreclose standing. 
 
229 See supra notes 209–14 and accompanying text. 
230 See supra text accompanying notes 122–28. 
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The Supreme Court has declared that “[t]he Constitution, in all 
its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of inde-
structible States.”231 For states meaningfully to endure, it is crucial 
that they be able proactively to defend their jurisdiction—their 
sovereignty—in federal court. 
 
231 Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1868). 
